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ABSTRACT 
  Can popular sovereignty and sovereign territory coexist? Can 
countries exchange sovereign territory consistently with the principle of 
self-determination? What if countries’ rights to territorial integrity were 
predicated on corresponding duties to govern well? And can the 
international system provide mechanisms and incentives to improve the 
status quo?  
  These questions are not simply academic. Across the world, many 
regions are located in the wrong nations—wrong in the sense that the 
people of these regions believe they would be safer, happier, and 
wealthier if surrounded by different borders and governed by different 
leaders. Such people might be able to improve their lot by emigrating 
or voting out their current government, but those are imperfect 
solutions and are often unavailable to those who need them most. We 
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ask how international law could help ameliorate the bad-government 
problem by facilitating welfare-enhancing border changes.  
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INTRODUCTION 
The location of borders shapes national identities, determines the 
ownership of valuable resources, and establishes who can claim various 
legal rights and benefits. Throughout history, people have fought and 
died to claim, protect, cross, or otherwise because of borders.1 
But even as borders shape people’s lives, people reshape them in 
return. Although the boundaries of sovereign territory are often 
delineated by natural features like mountains or rivers, they are 
ultimately products of human agency.2 And in a broader sense, many 
of the ongoing debates in international law—those regarding refugees, 
remedial secession, the responsibility to protect, and fiduciary duties, 
to take a few prominent examples—are very much about the 
relationship between sovereignty, territory, and people. To the extent 
that sovereignty is territorial (as it tends to be under traditional 
conceptions), countries may be able to resist popular will; to the extent 
that sovereignty resides in the people, the significance of territory 
seems to dissolve.3 But of course, neither option is fully satisfactory 
because sovereignty, territory, and people all seem to matter.  
Our goal in this Article is to account for sovereign territory in a 
world where sovereignty ultimately resides with the people.4 The 
challenge is designing a framework that respects, to the degree 
possible, both popular sovereignty and nations’ territorial integrity. We 
 
 1. Tayyab Mahmud, Colonial Cartographies, Postcolonial Borders, and Enduring Failures 
of International Law: The Unending Wars Along the Afghanistan-Pakistan Frontier, 36 BROOK. J. 
INT’L L. 1, 2 (2010); Steven R. Ratner, Land Feuds and Their Solutions: Finding International Law 
Beyond the Tribunal Chamber, 100 AM. J. INT’L. L. 808, 809 (2006). 
 2. See, e.g., ALBERTO ALESINA & ENRICO SPOLAORE, THE SIZE OF NATIONS 1–2 (2003) 
(criticizing international economists for treating borders as exogenous); Frank Jacobs & Parag 
Khanna, The New World, N.Y. TIMES: BORDERLINES (Sept. 22, 2012), http://www.nytimes.
com/interactive/2012/09/23/opinion/sunday/the-new-world.html [https://perma.cc/E5BN-YE2N] 
(“[H]istory chews up borders with the same purposeless determination that geology does, as 
seaside villas slide off eroding coastal cliffs.”). 
 3. See generally Thomas J. Biersteker, State, Sovereignty and Territory, in HANDBOOK OF 
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 157 (Walter Carlsnaes, Thomas Risse & Beth A. Simmons eds., 
2002) (demonstrating that the meaning of statehood has changed over time as a function of social 
context). 
 4. We use “region” to refer to geographic territory and the people living on it, and—where 
greater specificity seems necessary—will use “people of a region” or “regional population” to 
refer to the people alone. For the most part, we are not concerned here with unoccupied territory, 
nor with displaced persons. As to the latter, we propose a conceptually similar partial solution to 
the refugee crisis in Joseph Blocher & Mitu Gulati, Competing for Refugees: A Market-Based 
Solution to a Humanitarian Crisis, 48 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 53 (2016) [hereinafter, Blocher 
& Gulati, Competing for Refugees]. 
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attempt to do so by describing a “market” for sovereignty in which 
citizens of a region—as a collective—have tradable ownership rights,5 
and countries—with citizens’ approval—trade sovereign control over 
territory.6 In situations involving oppression, transfers could occur 
without the parent nation’s approval, sometimes even without 
compensation. Such a market would provide a mechanism for welfare-
enhancing border changes while accommodating both the self-
determination rights of citizens and the sovereign rights of nations to 
control their territory. It would permit a mechanism for peaceful 
secession. And by encouraging cross-border competition among 
governments, it could improve democratic responsiveness and increase 
governments’ incentives to treat their citizens well.7  
We refer to this framework as a market because it involves 
competition and transfers of a valued resource, but it is designed to 
maximize good governance rather than financial profit.8 In most 
countries, would-be governments already compete with each other for 
sovereign control—that is a basic characteristic of democracy. But this 
competition occurs within the limits of each country’s institutions, 
politics, and economics. And there are situations in which a particular 
region either has no effective voice in this process or is not able to 
thrive regardless of which domestic political party prevails. Under the 
current system, the people of that region might try to emigrate to other 
nations that are willing to have them and where they believe they can 
 
 5. We are not the first to suggest the utility of analogies to private law. See HERSCH 
LAUTERPACHT, PRIVATE LAW SOURCES AND ANALOGIES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 91 (1927) 
(“The part of international law upon which private law has engrafted itself most deeply is that 
relating to acquisition of sovereignty over land . . . .”). See generally id. (presenting private-law 
analogies in the realm of territorial sovereignty). For a similar argument focused on 
intragovernmental bargaining, see generally Aziz Z. Huq, The Negotiated Structural Constitution, 
114 COLUM. L. REV. 1595 (2014). 
 6. For the argument in the context of border sales between U.S. states, see generally Joseph 
Blocher, Selling State Borders, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 241 (2014). See also If States Traded Territory, 
ECONOMIST: THE WORLD IF (May 16, 2016, 6:46 PM), http://worldif.economist.com/article/
12138/country-market [https://perma.cc/DH5A-Y6EB]. 
 7. Though there are fundamental differences, the idea of a market for sovereign control 
shares features with the market for corporate control. See generally Frank H. Easterbrook & 
Daniel R. Fischel, The Proper Role of a Target’s Management in Responding to a Tender Offer, 
94 HARV. L. REV. 1161 (1981) (arguing that corporate managers should passively accept outside 
tender offers to increase shareholder welfare); Henry G. Manne, Mergers and the Market for 
Corporate Control, 73 J. POL. ECON. 110 (1965) (proposing that mergers among competitors 
would be more efficient than allowing a competitor to eventually go bankrupt). 
 8. We explore the market analogy further in Joseph Blocher & Mitu Gulati, Markets and 
Sovereignty (June 11, 2016) (unpublished manuscript), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2794501 
[https://perma.cc/QVV8-ZPJD] [hereinafter, Blocher & Gulati, Markets and Sovereignty]. 
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thrive. But emigrating is difficult—particularly for the poor, weak, or 
oppressed—and breaks up families and communities. What if, instead 
of a subset of the most productive and capable individuals emigrating 
to a new nation,9 the new nation could come to them? A market for 
sovereign control would allow dissatisfied regions to “vote” for 
governments beyond their current borders. 
There is reason to think that, at least in some cases, other nations 
will be interested in accepting these new territories. The drive to 
expand sovereign control has always been powerful,10 and sovereignty 
is already “for sale” in various forms. Governments often sell 
servitudes to one another11 and lease territory to foreign investors12 in 
ways that directly or indirectly limit their own sovereign control.13 
Nations seek control over territory for ports, military bases, farmland,14 
 
 9. See, e.g., Stacey Vanek Smith, Tiny Island Nation Kicks Off Trend of Selling Citizenship, 
NAT’L PUBLIC RADIO (Mar. 10, 2016, 3:56 PM), http://www.npr.org/2016/03/10/469972509/tiny-
island-nation-kicks-off-trend-of-selling-citizenship [https://perma.cc/YEQ9-NRPT]; Peter Wise, 
Sea, Sun and Easy Visas Lure China Buyers, FIN. TIMES (Oct. 8, 2014, 6:19 PM), http://www.ft.
com/cms/s/2/d7c1b472-44a6-11e4-ab0c-00144feabdc0.html#axzz4IvGfqRX1 [https://perma.cc/3N
2G-BJ5Q] (“‘The market for investor residence permits consists essentially of wealthy people 
living in countries they feel to be politically, economically or religiously unstable,’ says Charles 
Roberts, whose Fine & Country real estate firm has sold about 100 properties to Chinese.”).  
 10. Andrew F. Burghardt, The Bases of Territorial Claims, 63 GEOGRAPHICAL REV. 225, 
225 (1973) (“Virtually all states and empires have treated territory as being of itself good.”); see 
also id. (“[T]he wish to acquire more [territory] is admittedly a very natural and common thing; 
and when men succeed in this they are always praised rather than condemned.” (quoting 
NICCOLO MACHIAVELLI, THE PRINCE 42 (George Bull trans., Penguin Books ed. 1961) (1513))); 
Bernard H. Oxman, The Territorial Temptation: A Siren Song at Sea, 100 AM. J. INT’L L. 830, 830 
(2006) (“The history of international law since the Peace of Westphalia is in significant measure 
an account of the territorial temptation.”). 
 11. PETER STRAUSS, THE VIABILITY OF TERRITORIAL LEASES IN RESOLVING 
INTERNATIONAL SOVEREIGNTY DISPUTES 91–97 (2010). 
 12. See, e.g., Duncan Bartlett, Ethiopia Weighs Benefits of Foreign ‘Land Grabs,’ BBC NEWS 
(June 10, 2011), http://www.bbc.com/news/business-13725431 [https://perma.cc/QUR4-4XY7]; 
Alex Spillius, China ‘to Rent Five Per Cent of Ukraine,’ TELEGRAPH (Sept. 24, 2013, 7:18 PM), 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/china/10332007/China-to-rent-five-per-cent-of-
Ukraine.html [https://perma.cc/Z6CZ-JCGB]. 
 13. Jochen von Bernstorff, The Global “Land-Grab”, Sovereignty and Human Rights, 2 
ESIL REFLECTIONS 1, 3 (Oct. 18, 2013), http://www.esil-sedi.eu/node/426 [https://perma.cc/D994-
957B] (noting that when governments enter into large-scale land deals with foreign investors, 
“territorial sovereignty is affected for instance if large parts of the territory is [sic] leased to 
foreign governments for a period of 99 years, which is a standard clause in these land deals”). See 
generally PAUL R. VERKUIL, OUTSOURCING SOVEREIGNTY: WHY PRIVATIZATION OF 
GOVERNMENT FUNCTIONS THREATENS DEMOCRACY AND WHAT WE CAN DO ABOUT IT 
(2007) (arguing that the use of private contractors to perform essential government functions can 
undermine the effectiveness and morale of public government officials). 
 14. See John Vidal, How Food and Water Are Driving a 21st-Century African Land Grab, 
GUARDIAN (Mar. 7, 2010, 12:06 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2010/mar/07/
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canals,15 tax revenue, trade gains,16 and other reasons.17 On the sellers’ 
side, countries might generally be reluctant to part with territory, but 
they could be willing to do so when they are in serious economic need18 
or could achieve security or political goals by doing so.19 Nations 
already enter into agreements by which they yield authority over 
government functions such as the administration of law20 and military 
defense.21  
In this regard, the framework we have in mind would be largely 
consistent with existing international law, but that consistency 
illuminates at least two problems with the current legal structure. First, 
 
food-water-africa-land-grab [https://perma.cc/7597-BF2F] (“Ethiopia is only one of 20 or more 
African countries where land is being bought or leased for intensive agriculture on an immense 
scale in what may be the greatest change of ownership since the colonial era.”). 
 15. Jude Webber, Nicaragua Breaks Ground with $50bn Canal, FIN. TIMES (Dec. 23, 2014, 
4:53 AM), http://on.ft.com/1wYBUHe [https://perma.cc/35CC-HTFD] (describing the Chinese-
funded project). 
 16. Nancy Birdsall, The True True Size of Africa, CTR. FOR GLOB. DEV. BLOG (Nov. 11, 
2010), http://www.cgdev.org/blog/true-true-size-africa [https://perma.cc/E6GW-RHTK] (noting 
that Africa’s “economic size” is roughly equivalent to that of Chicago plus Atlanta, which is “why 
Africa’s leaders wish they could overcome the politics of sovereignty and eliminate the cost of all 
those borders—something the Europeans have been working on for half a century”). 
 17. See Andrea Janus, Turks and Caicos Premier “Not Closing the Door” on  
Canadians’ Caribbean Dreams, CTV NEWS (May 26, 2014, 12:39 PM), http://www.ctvnews.
ca/politics/turks-and-caicos-premier-not-closing-the-door-on-canadians-caribbean-dreams-1.183
8466 [https://perma.cc/P26M-93ZQ] (quoting Peter Goldring, a member of the Canadian 
parliament, on the century-old idea of acquiring Turks and Caicos: “The United States has a 
Hawaii. Why can’t Canada have a Hawaii?”); The Market for State Territory: Pass the Hemlock, 
ECONOMIST (Nov. 19, 2011) (“Arturas Zuokas, the mayor of Vilnius, has made a teasing offer to 
Greece; he suggested his country acquire an island as ‘an exclusive place for rest in the 
Mediterranean’ and ‘a great global advert for Lithuania,’ featuring a spa, museums and a 
theatre.”).  
 18. See, e.g., Elena Moya, Greece Starts Putting Island Land Up for Sale to Save Economy, 
GUARDIAN (June 24, 2010, 9:33 PM), http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/jun/24/greece-
islands-sale-save-economy [https://perma.cc/T9VV-5841]. 
 19. See generally Timothy William Waters, The Blessing of Departure: Acceptable and 
Unacceptable State Support for Demographic Transformation: The Lieberman Plan to Exchange 
Populated Territories in Cisjordan, 2 LAW & ETHICS HUM. RTS. 1 (2008) (describing and 
defending the legality of the Lieberman Plan, through which Israel would exchange some territory 
with the Palestinian Authority). 
 20. The Privy Council in London hears appeals from more than a dozen independent 
nations. On a more limited scale, the Netherlands ceded land to Scotland from 1999 until 2002 for 
the sole purpose of conducting a trial of the Lockerbie bombers. Uncertain Future for Camp Zeist, 
BBC NEWS (Mar. 14, 2002, 10:31 AM), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/1870685.stm [https://perma.cc/
98R9-R9UD]. 
 21. A handful of nations—including Costa Rica, Samoa, and Andorra—have no military and 
have “contracted” for protection through treaties. Others, including Palau and the Marshall 
Islands, are associated with another nation (the United States for those two) and receive 
protection for that reason. 
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traditional conceptions of international law permit nations to cede 
territory whether or not the territory’s residents give their consent. The 
market we describe would impose an additional restriction—the 
approval of the ceded region—that would reflect the evolving norm of 
self-determination.  
Second, the oft-conflicting principles of territorial sovereignty and 
self-determination—the latter of which has gained support in recent 
decades, though its legal status remains unclear—seem to force a 
choice between two absolutes: a default rule giving total sovereignty to 
parent nations and a narrow exception that transfers sovereignty to the 
people of a region in cases of extreme oppression, such as systematic 
human rights violations or genocide.22 It is unclear what fills the  
area in between—where the people of a region are systematically 
disadvantaged but not severely oppressed.  
Drawing from existing concepts in international law, we propose 
a rule to fill this gap: where a parent nation has failed to provide 
representation or equal treatment to a region,23 the nation’s 
entitlement to sovereign control becomes subject to a liability rule 
rather than a property rule. The parent nation, therefore, loses the 
power to forbid a cession but remains entitled to compensation set by 
the market (subject to review by a third party such as the ICJ).24 
 
 22. The United Nations has declared, for example, that “all peoples have the right freely to 
determine, without external interference, their political status and to pursue their economic, 
social and cultural development, and every State has the duty to respect this right in accordance 
with the provisions of the Charter.” G.A. Res. 2625 (XXV), at 123 (Oct. 24, 1970).  
A few paragraphs later, however, the same declaration clarifies: 
Nothing in the foregoing paragraphs shall be construed as authorizing or encouraging 
any action which would dismember or impair, totally or in part, the territorial integrity 
or political unity of sovereign and independent States conducting themselves in 
compliance with the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples as 
described above and thus possessed of a government representing the whole people 
belonging to the territory without distinction as to race, creed or colour.  
Id. at 124. These statements are hard to reconcile.  
 23. This standard comes from the Vienna Convention, which suggests that territorial 
sovereignty is predicated on representativeness and equal treatment. See infra note 94 and 
accompanying text. 
 24. See generally Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, 
and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089 (1972) (identifying property 
rules and liability rules as basic forms of legal entitlement). Although they are not exactly 
voluntary from the perspective of the parent nations, we consider these liability-rule transactions 
as part of the broader market for sovereign control. In Calabresi and Melamed’s framework, 
values under a liability framework are assigned by a third party, rather than by a market—our 
framework combines elements of each. See GUIDO CALABRESI, THE FUTURE OF LAW & 
ECONOMICS: ESSAYS IN REFORM AND RECOLLECTION 129 (2016) (noting that “liability-rule 
charges often look like, and are properly described as, prices”).  
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Our framework therefore fills a gap in the legal system between 
the historical conception of regions as the property of the parent nation 
and the modern principle of self-determination in cases of human 
rights violations. That gap can be filled by a rule that, by allowing easier 
regional exit, incentivizes parent nations to treat their marginal regions 
better (for fear that the region will attempt to exit) and parent nations 
and regions to split up earlier when the relationship is not working (by 
providing for higher returns to both sides from an earlier exit). 
As with any conceptual framework, we do not expect this proposal 
to translate directly into practice, nor is it our goal to redraw the world 
map. Yet the potential practical implications are significant. Many 
contemporary borders were drawn at the whim of colonial 
administrators.25 Others are products of military conquest or royal 
decree, such as the King of X bequeathing a dowry for his daughter’s 
marriage to the King of Y.26 Though time has transformed some of 
these idiosyncrasies into stable national identities, other undesirable 
boundaries have worsened. Whatever the cause, the result is that some 
populated regions are in the “wrong” countries, and some sovereigns 
have contemplated changing borders through market transactions in 
the way this Article describes. Consider the following:  
• Threatened by a rising ocean, the island nation of Kiribati 
recently purchased territory in Fiji.27 The Maldives face a 
similar problem and are considering a similar solution.28 
What rules of international law govern these purchases? 
 
 25. See, e.g., Tarek Osman, Why Border Lines Drawn with a Ruler in WW1 Still Rock the 
Middle East, BBC NEWS (Dec. 14, 2013), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-25299553 
[https://perma.cc/78G9-65WL] (describing the much-loathed Sykes–Picot border line and its 
relationship to the current conflict in Iraq and Syria). 
 26. See Anthony Farrington, Trading Places: The East India Company and Asia, 52 HIST. 
TODAY 5, 40 (2002) (noting that Portugal gave Bombay to the British empire as part of the dowry 
of Catherine of Braganza, daughter of King John IV of Portugal, who married King Charles II of 
Britain); see also ALASTAIR BONNETT, UNRULY PLACES 183 (2014) (recounting the story of two-
hundred enclaves near the India–Bangladesh border that were “won or lost in a chess game 
between the Maharajah of Cooch Behar and the Nawab of Rangpur in the early eighteenth 
century”). 
 27. Laurence Caramel, Besieged by the Rising Tides of Climate Change, Kiribati Buys Land 
in Fiji, GUARDIAN (July 1, 2014, 1:00 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/environment/
2014/jul/01/kiribati-climate-change-fiji-vanua-levu [https://perma.cc/4Q59-VJ32]. The purchase 
does not seem to have conferred full sovereignty, and, unsurprisingly, this exchange faces many 
practical and political obstacles. See James Ellsmoor & Zachary Rosen, Kiribati’s Land Purchase 
in Fiji: Does It Make Sense?, DEVPOLICYBLOG (Jan. 11, 2016), http://devpolicy.org/kitibatis-land-
purchase-in-fiji-does-it-make-sense-20160111 [https://perma.cc/Y528-P2VL]. 
 28. Ellsmoor & Rosen, supra note 27.  
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• In the lead-up to the Falklands War, several of Margaret 
Thatcher’s senior advisors suggested that the United 
Kingdom avoid the conflict with Argentina by “buying out” 
the few thousand residents living in the Falkland Islands 
and associated islands, offering them $100,000 per family to 
settle in Britain, Australia, or New Zealand.29 But the plan 
was shelved and a thousand lives were lost in the ensuing 
war. Now, the United Kingdom spends around $100 million 
annually to maintain a military presence on the islands,30 
Argentina continues to demand their return, and the 
islanders themselves have voted overwhelmingly to 
maintain their U.K. citizenship—which, in turn, is the 
primary reason for the British military presence.31 What if 
Argentina offered the islanders $1 million each to approve 
a change?32  
• In 1997, the United Kingdom ceded sovereign control of 
Hong Kong to China. Suppose that, having now had nearly 
twenty years of experience under Chinese rule, a 
supermajority of Hong Kong’s residents would like to 
return to British control.33 Can the people of Hong Kong 
pay China to shift sovereignty back to the United 
Kingdom?34 
Our framework suggests possible solutions, drawn partially from 
market design, to these difficult practical questions. The first Part of 
 
 29. Ronaldo Munck, Malvinas: Politics, Territory and Internationalism, 3 GLOBAL 
DISCOURSE 151, 153 (2013).  
 30. INT’L AFFAIRS & DEFENCE SECTION, THE DEFENCE OF THE FALKLAND ISLANDS, 2012, 
HC SN06201, at 6 (UK) (giving annual projections from 2006 through 2011). 
 31. Argentina President Cristina Kirchner Renews Falkland Islands Claim at UN  
Meeting, TELEGRAPH (Aug. 7, 2013, 4:44 AM), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/
southamerica/falklandislands/10227319/Argentina-President-Cristina-Kirchner-renews-Falkland
-Islands-claim-at-UN-meeting.html [https://perma.cc/H2LQ-LPAT]. 
 32. See infra notes 150–51 and accompanying text. 
 33. Phila Siu & Tony Cheung, Poll Finds Fewer Hongkongers Identifying as Chinese, Thanks 
to Occupy, S. CHINA MORNING POST (Nov. 11, 2014, 4:49 AM), http://www.scmp.com/news/hong-
kong/article/1636818/poll-finds-fewer-hongkongers-identifying-chinese-thanks-occupy [https://
perma.cc/W4UT-XKS3] (reporting a Chinese university survey showing that “Hongkongers’ 
sense of Chinese identity has hit a record low”); Poll Says Hong Kongers Would Prefer British 
Rule, RADIO FREE ASIA (Mar. 14, 2013), http://www.rfa.org/english/news/china/hong-kong-
03142013141313.html [https://perma.cc/S54Q-HERG] (reporting informal online poll suggesting 
that more than 90 percent of Hong Kongers would vote to rejoin the United Kingdom). 
 34. China Blocks British MPs’ Visit to Hong Kong, BBC NEWS (Nov. 30, 2014), http://
www.bbc.com/news/uk-politics-30267026 [https://perma.cc/KCT3-H36N] (quoting Lord Patten, a 
former British governor of Hong Kong: “When China asserts that what is happening in Hong 
Kong is nothing to do with us, we should make it absolutely clear . . . that it is not the case”). 
BLOCHER & GULATI IN PRINTER FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 1/5/2017  12:01 PM 
806  DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 66:797 
the Article identifies the existing international rules, including their 
contradictions and gaps, and suggests alterations that would better 
reflect ascendant principles like that of self-determination. The second 
Part proposes a conceptual framework to facilitate welfare-enhancing 
changes in sovereign control. The third Part attempts to answer the 
most forceful criticisms we anticipate, and the fourth discusses caveats 
and complications. 
I.  THE LEGALITY OF TRANSFERRING SOVEREIGN CONTROL  
International law is obsessed with borders. In many ways, the 
international legal order depends on them.35 Borders delineate 
nations36 and are the building blocks of international law and politics. 
It is unsurprising, then, that international law has developed doctrines 
and institutions to address issues like cession of sovereign territory and 
border disputes. Although our proposed framework tries to respect 
existing rules—which is not always easy, given the internal tensions and 
conflicts of international law—it would require some changes to the 
current system.37 
Current international law identifies at least two starkly distinct 
scenarios in which sovereign authority and quality of governance are 
related. If a region faces severe oppression or genocide, it can leave for 
free. If not, the parent nation can cede and acquire territory as it wishes 
with no need for regional approval. These paradigm cases track the 
underlying legal concepts of self-determination and remedial secession 
on the one hand and territorial sovereignty on the other. The 
legitimacy of remedial secession remains quite controversial in 
international law, and it may be too soon to call it a “rule.” But we 
accept it for purposes of the current analysis.38  
In addition to embracing the contested principle of remedial 
secession, this framework incorporates three legal changes that better 
reflect modern trends in international law. First, nations seeking to 
abandon or transfer a region must first obtain the approval of that 
 
 35. See Jan Paulsson, Boundary Disputes Into the Twenty-First Century: Why, How . . . and 
Who?, 95 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 122, 128 (2001). 
 36. PAUL GILBERT, THE PHILOSOPHY OF NATIONALISM 91 (1998). 
 37. For discussion of the requirement that nations permit regional votes, see infra notes 80–
81 and accompanying text. For discussion of the requirement that citizens in realigned regions 
receive citizenship in the new country, see infra note 85 and accompanying. For a description of 
“liability rule” protection for countries that deny representation or equal rights, see infra notes 
89–94.  
 38. See infra Part II.B. 
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region’s citizens. This additional restriction would help account for the 
self-determination interests of the relevant region and could (perhaps 
paradoxically) encourage more transfers by legitimizing them.  
Second is the introduction of the liability-rule regime.39 Even 
under the principle of remedial secession, the only way a region can 
currently exit against the wishes of the parent nation is if there is 
extremely severe oppression. In our proposed system, by contrast, a 
nation that substantially fails to satisfy its fiduciary-type obligations to 
a region would have to let that region depart, but would be entitled to 
compensation. This middle ground would fill the gap between the two 
extremes. 
Third, we envision sovereigns evaluating foreign regions to see 
whether they could ally with those regions for mutual benefit. Under 
the current international law regime, even the contemplation of such a 
possibility could be seen as a violation of territorial sovereignty. But 
for a market to work, it is important for outside nations to consider 
whether other nations are underperforming in the management of their 
own regions.  
A. The Traditional Rule: Territorial Sovereignty and National 
Control 
There are two primary sources of international law: treaties and 
custom. Because there is no general treaty regarding sales of sovereign 
territory,40 the relevant international rules for this analysis are derived 
from customary international law (CIL). Under the textbook 
definition, CIL is present if two conditions are satisfied: (1) widespread 
practice among nations and (2) performance of that practice by states 
out of a sense of legal obligation (opinio juris).41 Given the near 
impossibility of identifying the subjective intentions of states, the 
 
 39. See infra Part II.C. 
 40. Background treaty obligations regarding debt, political alliances, and so on could be 
implicated by a sale of sovereign control, but international law has already created tools that 
might be useful for that task. See 1 LASSA OPPENHEIM, OPPENHEIM’S INTERNATIONAL LAW 224 
(Robert Jennings & Arthur Watts eds., 9th ed. 1992) (“When by cession or otherwise, a part of a 
state’s territory is transferred to another, a succession to certain rights and obligations associated 
with the transferred territory occurs.”). See generally Vienna Convention on the Succession of 
States in Respect of Treaties, Aug. 23, 1978, 1946 U.N.T.S 3 (setting rules for the succession of 
states, but not providing for sales).  
 41. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED  
STATES § 102(2) (AM. LAW INST. 1987) (defining CIL as the law of the international community 
that “results from a general and consistent practice of states followed by them from a sense of 
legal obligation”). 
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doctrine translates as a practical matter into an examination of actual 
state practices and inferences from those practices, along with a 
consideration of whether other states have objected to those practices 
or accepted them as legal.42  
To satisfy the first part of the test—an evaluation of state 
practice—we must identify transfers of sovereign territory that were 
not said to violate international law. Such examples are widespread. In 
part, the historical record shows that there have been many sales of 
territorial control between sovereigns at peace with one another. 
Examples in U.S. history include the purchases of Louisiana from 
France in 1803,43 Florida from Spain in 1819,44 Alaska from Russia in 
1867,45 and the Virgin Islands from Denmark in 1916.46 Similar 
examples abound across the globe.47 Bombay (now Mumbai), for 
example, was part of the 1661 dowry given by the Portuguese to King 
Charles II of Britain.48 
In addition to peaceful transfers, nations often buy and sell 
territory at the end of an armed conflict. After its war with Mexico, the 
United States purchased 525,000 square miles for $15 million and an 
agreement to assume claims against Mexico by private citizens living in 
that territory.49 After the Spanish-American War, it purchased the 
 
 42. See generally MAURICE MENDELSOHN, THE FORMATION OF CUSTOMARY 
INTERNATIONAL LAW (1998) (describing this approach).  
 43. The United States paid France $15 million for nine-hundred-thousand square miles of 
territory. See JON KUKLA, A WILDERNESS SO IMMENSE: THE LOUISIANA PURCHASE AND THE 
DESTINY OF AMERICA 335 (2003). 
 44. See Treaty of Amity, Settlement, and Limits Between the United States of America and 
His Catholic Majesty, Spain-U.S., Feb. 22, 1819, 8 Stat. 252. 
 45. The United States paid Russia $7.2 million for 586,412 square miles of territory. See 
Treaty Concerning the Cession of the Russian Possessions in North America by His Majesty the 
Emperor of All the Russias to the United States of America, art. VI, Russ.-U.S., Mar. 30, 1867, 
15 Stat. 539. 
 46. The United States purchased the Danish West Indies from Denmark, in the process 
ceding U.S. claims to portions of Greenland. See Treaty on Cession of the Danish West Indies, 
Den.-U.S., Aug. 4, 1916, 39 Stat. 1706. 
 47. Germany, for example, purchased the Caroline Islands and Northern Mariana Islands 
from Spain in 1899 for 25 million pesetas. See German-Spanish Treaty of 1899, Ger.-Spain, Feb. 
12, 1899, Gaceta de Madrid, 1 de Julio de 1899 (Spain), http://www.boe.es/datos/pdfs/BOE/
1899/182/A00001-00001.pdf [https://perma.cc/K34T-8LBR]; see also ARTHUR NUSSBAUM, A 
CONCISE HISTORY OF THE LAW OF NATIONS 128 (1947) (noting that “[t]reaties of the medieval 
type, by which a prince in one way or another, might dispose of his territory, are still found” in 
the 1700s). 
 48. See supra note 26. 
 49. Treaty of Peace, Friendship, Limits, and Settlement Between the United States of 
America and the United Mexican States Concluded at Guadalupe Hidalgo, arts. XII-XIII, Mex.-
U.S., Feb. 2, 1848, 9 Stat. 922 [hereinafter Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo]. 
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Philippines at a price equivalent to $2.00 per resident.50 The Chinese 
grants of concessions in Shanghai to the British and the French in 1860 
and the sale of Hong Kong and Kowloon to the British in the 1840s 
after the Opium Wars are further examples of such war settlements.51 
The nineteenth and early twentieth centuries were full of what one 
might call contingent sales. Sovereign debtors would pledge streams of 
tax revenues—tobacco, guano, alcohol, salt, and the like—to foreign 
creditors.52 If the debts went unpaid and a settlement proved elusive, 
the foreign creditors would try to get their governments to send troops 
to take over the customs houses of the defaulting governments. These 
pledges of revenues were in effect contingent sales of sovereign 
control, and although many Latin American nations argued that the 
manner of their enforcement—gunboat diplomacy—was illegal, they 
did not challenge the underlying sale of sovereign control.  
Even though outright sales of sovereign territory are no longer 
common, countries continue to buy and sell some degree of sovereign 
control from one another.53 Leases of land to foreign governments for 
the construction and governance of military bases and embassies 
involve limited cessions of sovereign authority in exchange for 
remuneration.54  
 
 50. Lowell B. Bautista, The Historical Context and Legal Basis of the Philippine Treaty 
Limits, 10 ASIAN-PAC. L. & POL’Y J. 1, 17 (2008) (citing THE FILIPINO NATION: A CONCISE 
HISTORY OF THE PHILIPPINES 17 (Helen R. Tubangui et al. eds., 1982)). 
 51. See, e.g., Burghardt, supra note 10. Andrew Burghardt notes: 
In 1815, when Austria was forced to surrender the Netherlands, she obtained Venice 
and Milan as recompense; Sweden obtained Norway to compensate for her lack of 
Pomerania and Finland; the Netherlands received Belgium for surrendering Ceylon, 
South Africa, and Guyana to the British. In 1919 France requested control of the Saar 
Basin as a reparation for the destroyed coal mines in the north of France. 
Id. at 238.  
 52. See NORBERT GAILLARD, WHEN SOVEREIGNS GO BANKRUPT: A STUDY OF 
SOVEREIGN RISK § 2.1.2 (2014); Kris Mitchener & Marc D. Weidenmier, Supersanctions and 
Sovereign Debt Repayment, 29 J. INT’L MONEY & FIN. 19, 24 (2010). 
 53. See supra notes 11–21 and accompanying text; see also Pass the Hemlock, supra note 17, 
explaining:  
  In an era of self-determination sales of territory have come to seem anachronistic. 
But leases, involving a de facto transfer of control, are common. In 2010 Russia 
extended a deal granting Finland a canal for 50 years, and gave Ukraine concessions 
worth €30 billion to park its fleet at Sevastopol for 25 more years. 
Id.  
 54. This exchange is not because embassies are the sovereign territory of the represented 
state, but because international agreements typically give the premises of diplomatic missions 
some immunity from local civil and criminal law. See Vienna Convention on Consular Relations 
arts. 40–57, April 24, 1963, 21 U.S.T. 3227, 500 U.N.T.S. 95; Vienna Convention on Diplomatic 
Relations arts. 31–39, Apr. 18, 1961, 23 U.S.T. 3227, 500 U.N.T.S. 95.  
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In sum, there is abundant historical precedent for the sale of 
sovereign control. Explicit sales, contingent sales, and leases of 
territory have been occurring between sovereigns for hundreds of 
years.  
The second requirement—opinio juris—is likely satisfied as well. 
Treatise writers have long acknowledged the traditional rule that 
countries have a nearly unbridled power to engage in cession, which is 
“the transfer of sovereignty over state territory by the owner-state to 
another state.”55 As Robert Jennings and Arthur Watts note, such 
cessions require no approval of the affected regions: 
The hardship involved for the inhabitants of the territory who remain 
and lose their old citizenship and are handed over to a new sovereign 
whether they like it or not, created a movement in favour of the claim 
that no cession should be valid until the inhabitants had by plebiscite 
given their consent to the cession . . . . But it cannot be said that 
international law makes it a condition of every cession that it should 
be ratified by a plebiscite.56 
Holding aside the demands of good governance, then, the matter is 
entirely up to the countries involved. 
Contemporary scholars agree. Steven Ratner notes that “states 
generally are free to agree on the disposition of disputed noncolonial 
(or non-trust or -mandated) territory and its ultimate borders as they 
see fit.”57 And Seokwoo Lee writes: “International law does not seem 
to prescribe any specific limits on the right of a state to cede its 
territory. . . . ‘All that matters is that the cession takes place with the 
full ‘consent of the Governments concerned.’”58  
 
 55. OPPENHEIM, supra note 40, at 679; see R.Y. JENNINGS, THE ACQUISITION OF 
TERRITORY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 16 (1963) (defining cession as “the renunciation made by 
one state in favour of another of the rights and title which the former may have to the territory in 
question”). The process by which sovereign control over a region changes is also known as 
succession. IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 587 (3d ed. 1979) 
(“[S]tate succession arises when there is a definitive replacement of one state by another in 
respect of sovereignty over a given territory in conformance with international law.”); see Amos 
S. Hershey, The Succession of States, 5 AM. J. INT’L L. 285, 285 (1911) (referring to a situation in 
which “a state acquires a portion of the territory of another through cession or conquest” as a 
“[p]artial succession”).  
 56. OPPENHEIM, supra note 40, at 684.  
 57. Ratner, supra note 1, at 811. Colonial territory is subject to the rule of uti possidetis, 
though even that rule can be contracted around. Id.; see Joshua Castellino, Territorial Integrity 
and the “Right” to Self-Determination: An Examination of the Conceptual Tools, 33 BROOK. J. 
INT’L L. 503, 549 & n.262 (2008). 
 58. Seokwoo Lee, Continuing Relevance of Traditional Modes of Territorial Acquisition in 
International Law and a Modest Proposal, 16 CONN. J. INT’L L. 1, 10 (2000); see 1 GEORG 
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B. Modern Principles: Self-Determination and Popular Control 
The traditional rule thus permits governments to treat populated 
regions as their property, giving the people of the impacted region no 
say in cessions. We argue that this rule has lost its legitimacy, partially 
because it has fallen into disuse and partially because it is incompatible 
with modern principles like self-determination. 
Emer de Vattel suggested as much centuries ago. Vattel accepted 
that cessions of sovereignty must be permitted in some cases even 
without public approval,59 but he was generally more skeptical of the 
practice than some of his contemporaries (including Hugo Grotius).60 
Vattel specifically rejected the idea that a nation could benefit itself by 
buying and selling citizens: a nation “has not . . . a right to traffic with 
their rank and liberty, on account of any advantages it may expect to 
derive from such a negotiation.”61 The key factor for Vattel was that 
approval for such sales must be given by the true owners of the 
nation—the people: “[A]s the nation alone has a right to subject itself 
to a foreign power, the right of really alienating the state can never 
belong to the sovereign unless it be expressly given him by the entire 
body of the people.”62  
In this respect, Vattel anticipated self-determination, which is the 
right of peoples and regions to choose their own national affiliations—
for example, through secession or realignment. The degree to which 
self-determination and concomitant rights like secession are 
mandatory rules of international law remains unclear,63 and we do not 
 
SCHWARZENBERGER, INTERNATIONAL LAW AS APPLIED BY INTERNATIONAL COURTS AND 
TRIBUNALS 303 (3d ed. 1957). 
 59. EMMERICH DE VATTEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS, OR, PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF 
NATURE, APPLIED TO THE CONDUCT AND AFFAIRS OF NATIONS AND SOVEREIGNS, Ch.  
XXI, § 263 (Joseph Chitty ed., Philadelphia, T. & J.W. Johnson & Co. 1867) (1758); see Stéphane 
Beaulac, Vattel’s Doctrine on Territory Transfers in International Law and the Cession of 
Louisiana to the United States of America, 63 LA. L. REV. 1327, 1345 (2003) (arguing that the 
“only exception” to Vattel’s requirement of public consent “is in situations of pressing necessity 
or danger to public safety . . . which validate the cession of territory as between the parties to such 
treaties” and “[a]s for the individuals living there, they are not bound by even such a necessary 
transfer unless they consent to it”). 
 60. VATTEL, supra note 59, at Ch. V, § 69 (“I know that many authors, and particularly 
Grotius, give long enumerations of the alienations of sovereignties. But the examples often prove 
only the abuse of power, not the right. And besides, the people consented to the alienation, either 
willingly or by force.”). 
 61. Id. at Ch. XXI, § 263. 
 62. Id. at Ch. V, § 69. 
 63. See Allen Buchanan, Theories of Secession, 26 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 31, 33 (1997); Hurst 
Hannum, Rethinking Self-Determination, 34 VA. J. INT’L L. 1, 42 (1993). The focus here is on 
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suppose that they are. But—whether out of obligation or not—many 
nations have long sought local approval of territorial secession,64 and 
many secessionist movements (including Scotland, Crimea, and 
Catalonia in 2014) have held votes to assert that approval.  
Whether or not it has achieved the status of an enforceable legal 
right, it is fair to say that self-determination has grown from an abstract 
aspiration to a principle recognized in foundational legal documents.65 
Further, although this is a highly contested matter, many see the right 
of self-determination as having evolved to include a right of remedial 
secession in cases of severe oppression.66 The willingness to depart 
from traditional territorial sovereignty is also reflected in the idea that 
the world community has a “responsibility to protect” those people 
 
international law, so it is not necessary to address the degree to which domestic law might forbid 
secession. To some degree, as with our liability-rule scenario, we anticipate that the former will 
trump the latter. 
 64. See OPPENHEIM, supra note 40, at 434–35, 455–57 (noting that even when territory is 
obtained through prescription, it is typically ratified by plebiscite); Eyal Benvenisti, The Origins 
of the Concept of Belligerent Occupation, 26 LAW & HIST. REV. 621, 628 (2008) (crediting 
eighteenth-century French practice for the norm that cessions of territory between nations are 
not valid unless popularly approved); Waters, supra note 19, at 20–21 (noting that although “there 
is no actual obligation,” there is “precedent for the practice of consulting an affected 
population”).  
 65. See International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights art. 1, Dec. 16, 1966, 
993 U.N.T.S. 3; International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 1, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 
U.N.T.S. 171; Western Sahara, Advisory Opinion, 1975 I.C.J. 12, 122 (Oct. 16) (Dillard, J., 
concurring) (“It is for the people to determine the destiny of the territory . . . .”); G.A. Res. 1541 
(XV), U.N. Doc. A/Res/1541 (XV), at 29 (Dec. 15, 1960) (explaining that self-determination 
could lead to secession and the formation of a new state, association of a territory with an existing 
state, or integration of a territory into an already existing state); W. OFUATEY-KODJOE, THE 
PRINCIPLE OF SELF-DETERMINATION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 147 (1977) (“Today, there is no 
doubt that self-determination, as defined in U.N. and general international practice, is a principle 
of international law which yields a right to self-government that can be claimed legitimately by 
bona fide dependent peoples.”). 
 66. For a description of the evolution of the self-determination concept, see generally Patrick 
Macklem, Self-Determination in Three Movements, in THE THEORY OF SELF-DETERMINATION 
94 (Fernando R. Tesón ed., 2016). See ALLEN BUCHANAN, JUSTICE, LEGITIMACY, AND SELF-
DETERMINATION: MORAL FOUNDATIONS FOR INTERNATIONAL LAW 335 (2004); LEE C. 
BUCHHEIT, SECESSION: THE LEGITIMACY OF SELF-DETERMINATION 220–23 (1978); Thomas 
Franck, Postmodern Tribalism and the Right to Secession, in PEOPLES AND MINORITIES IN 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 3, 3–27 (Catherine Brölmann, René Lefeber & Marjoleine Zieck eds., 
1993). But see Donald L. Horowitz, A Right to Secede?, in NOMOS XLV: SECESSION AND SELF-
DETERMINATION 50, 50–51 (Stephen Macedo & Allan Buchanan eds., 2003) (questioning the 
normative desirability of remedial secession); Jure Vidmar, Remedial Secession in International 
Law: Theory and (Lack of) Practice, 6 ST ANTONY’S INT’L REV. 37, 37–40 (2010) (questioning 
support for remedial secession). 
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whose human rights are threatened.67 The underlying idea is that states 
that fail to protect their own people from mass atrocities lose their right 
to territorial integrity. When these atrocities occur, the global 
community, with appropriate authorization from the United Nations, 
can intervene.68 Indeed, the growing strength of the self-determination 
right helps explain the lack of sovereign sales after World War II.  
C. Filling the Gap 
These two extreme positions—one giving absolute control to the 
parent nation and the other giving absolute control to the dissatisfied 
region—leave a gap. It has been said that “the defining issue in 
international law for the twenty-first century is finding compromises 
between the principles of self-determination and the sanctity of 
borders.”69 How can a self-determination norm coexist with nations’ 
absolute power to maintain or cede regions? What about regions that 
are substantially underserved by their parent nations but not quite 
oppressed?  
First, like Vattel, we would require regional approval for cessions. 
This would mean imposing more restrictions on parent nations than 
the traditional approach appears to do, but it would better satisfy the 
two-part definition of CIL. As to the requirement of widespread 
practice, we are not aware of any country selling a populated region in 
at least a half-century.70 And as to the opinio juris requirement, the 
 
 67. See, e.g., 2005 World Summit Outcome, G.A. Res. 60/1, ¶¶ 139–42 U.N. Doc. 
A/RES/60/1, at ### (Oct. 24, 2005); U.N. Secretary-General, Implementing the Responsibility To 
Protect, at 4–10, U.N. Doc. A/63/677 (Jan. 12, 2009); BUCHHEIT, supra note 66; E. Tendayi 
Achiume, Syria, Cost-Sharing, and the Responsibility to Protect Refugees, 100 MINN. L. REV. 687, 
712–17 (2015); Ratner, supra note 1, at 811.  
 68. See Report of the Secretary-General, supra note 67; see also Gareth Evans, From 
Humanitarian Intervention to Responsibility to Protect, 24 WIS. INT’L L.J. 703, 709 (2006) (“The 
starting point is that any state has a primary responsibility to protect the individuals within 
it. . . . [W]here the state fails in that responsibility, through either incapacity or ill will, a secondary 
responsibility to protect falls on the international community, acting primarily through the UN.” 
(footnote omitted)).  
 69. Michael P. Scharf, Earned Sovereignty: Juridical Underpinnings, 31 DENV. J. INT’L L. & 
POL’Y 373, 373 (2003); see ANTONIO CASSESE, SELF-DETERMINATION OF PEOPLES: A LEGAL 
REAPPRAISAL 190 (1995); Lea Brilmayer, Secession and Self-Determination: A Territorial 
Interpretation, 16 YALE J. INT’L L. 177, 201–02 (1991). 
 70. See If States Traded Territory, supra note 6 (identifying the Treaty of the Danish West 
Indies from 1916 as “the last time a country has directly sold control over territory to another”). 
There is little understanding of how and when CIL doctrines die through nonuse. That said, 
whatever the rule for CIL expiry is, the doctrine allowing sovereign sales of populated territory 
would likely satisfy it. See generally Michael J. Glennon, How International Rules Die,  
93 GEO. L.J. 939 (2005) (explaining how international laws “perish”); Roger Alford, The Death  
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increasing acceptance of self-determination as a right and not simply 
an aspiration suggests that Vattel was right.  
Our second and third departures from international law—the 
protection of territorial sovereignty with a liability rule in cases of ill-
governed regions and the allowance of outside nations to search for 
underperforming regions in other nations—do not square with 
historical international practice and, therefore, traditional CIL. The 
empirical evidence on how courts find CIL, however, shows that the 
textbook definition is, for the most part, followed only in the breach.71 
Instead—necessarily being more speculative—courts appear to employ 
a kind of common law process using historical evidence to identify 
customary rules that will enhance global welfare. We think our 
framework would be consistent with a welfare-enhancing judicial 
perspective.72  
Because the threshold for remedial secession is so high,73 in 
practice it seems that a region must suffer serious human rights 
violations to leave.74 Our goal is to prevent these severely oppressive 
scenarios from arising in the first place, by providing a mechanism that 
respects territorial sovereignty while giving nations more incentive to 
permit welfare-enhancing changes in sovereignty. A market for 
sovereign control has the potential to do just that, because mistreated 
 
of a Customary Rule of International Law, OPINIO JURIS (Aug. 28, 2009), http://
opiniojuris.org/2009/08/28/the-death-of-a-customary-rule-of-international-law [https://perma.cc/
4C4L-SVK7] (exploring how a practice that “has achieved the status of customary international 
law cease[s] to become international law”).  
 71. See generally Stephen J. Choi & Mitu Gulati, Customary International Law: How Do 
Courts Do It?, in CUSTOM’S FUTURE: INTERNATIONAL LAW IN A CHANGING WORLD 117, 146–
47 (Curtis A. Bradley ed., 2016) (finding that international courts often ignore the textbook legal 
rule in light of a pressing global need for new law); Ryan Scoville, Finding Custom, 101 IOWA L. 
REV. 1893, 1899, 1935–40 (2016) (examining U.S. domestic court determinations of CIL). 
 72. See Flomo v. Firestone Nat’l Rubber Co., 643 F.3d 1013, 1016 (7th Cir. 2011) 
(“Customary international law thus resembles common law in its original sense as law arising 
from custom rather than law that is formally promulgated.”); Curtis A. Bradley, Customary 
International Law Adjudication as Common Law Adjudication, in CUSTOM’S FUTURE: 
INTERNATIONAL LAW IN A CHANGING WORLD, supra note 71, at 34, 50–54 (describing such an 
approach); BRIAN D. LEPARD, CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW: A NEW THEORY WITH 
PRACTICAL APPLICATIONS 98–99 (2010) (similar).  
 73. Reference re Secession of Quebec, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 218, ¶ 126 (Can.) (“A right to external 
self-determination (which in this case potentially takes the form of the assertion of a right to 
unilateral secession) arises in only the most extreme of cases and, even then, under carefully 
defined circumstances.” (emphasis omitted)); William W. Burke-White, Crimea and the 
International Legal Order, (Penn Law Sch. Pub. Law & Legal Theory Research Paper Series, 
Paper No. 14-24, 2014), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2474084 [https://perma.cc/L3UG-9XCB].  
 74. See Burghardt, supra note 10, at 232. 
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regions wanting to leave a country could in effect buy their way out of 
a bad situation. If the people of region X would rather live in Country 
B than Country A, they could bid—rather than fight—for their 
freedom. If Country B supports the move, perhaps because of 
historical or ethnic kinship with the residents of X, then it can facilitate 
the move by adding consideration to the bid.  
This approach represents a better negotiation of the conflicting 
principles of territorial integrity and self-determination. In our system, 
misbehaving-but-not-oppressive countries will be entitled to 
compensation for a loss of sovereign territory. On the flip side, the 
people living in that territory will have self-determination but must pay 
for it. Our proposal delivers neither full territorial integrity nor an 
unencumbered right of self-determination. But it does accommodate 
both of those conflicting principles.  
The transactions we have in mind will not be feasible in every 
secession dispute. Given the politically and emotionally fraught 
scenarios that lead to such disputes, there will often be gaps between 
asking and offer prices. Countries may be unwilling to give up territory 
they consider to be part of their identity; people may be unwilling to 
pay for something that they think is their right. 
In such situations, outside funding might be available. After all, 
violent secessions are costly to the international community in terms of 
money spent and lives lost.75 Rather than pay for military intervention 
or nation rebuilding, international organizations might prefer to 
facilitate border-changing treaties by simply buying out a nation’s 
claim. Similarly, a neighboring nation—perhaps the one that the region 
wishes to join—might top up the territory’s bid with funds of its own.  
II.  THE FRAMEWORK 
A. Starting Points 
We base our proposal on a few principles distilled from the 
foregoing discussion of borders and international law.  
 
 75. Development aid in 2013 was approximately $138.4 billion. OECD, AID TO 
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES REBOUNDS IN 2013 TO REACH AN ALL-TIME HIGH 1  
(2014), http://www.oecd.org/newsroom/aid-to-developing-countries-rebounds-in-2013-to-reach-
an-all-time-high.htm [https://perma.cc/K44G-UK6F]. Roughly a quarter-million troops were 
involved in peacekeeping operations. See Jane Dundon, Global Trends in Peacekeeping 
Operations, in STOCKHOLM INTERNATIONAL PEACE RESEARCH INSTITUTE, SIPRI YEARBOOK 
2013, at 61, 63 (2013) (reporting approximately 233,000 troops deployed in 2012). 
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1. The Problem of Borders. 
 
• There are nations and regions whose people would be 
better off with different national affiliations. 
• Nations tend to resist border changes because they do not 
want to allow their regions to become independent or to 
affiliate with another nation. 
• This resistance, and the lack of incentives or mechanisms to 
overcome it, is the main obstacle to welfare-enhancing 
border changes. 
• When changes do occur—usually because of violent 
secession or outside intervention—the rules are unclear 
with regard to what compensation the former parent nation 
should receive for matters such as national debt, past 
investments, and lost natural resources.  
2. Legal Background. 
 
• Traditional international law permits nations to cede 
regions without the approval of the region’s residents.76  
• If people living within a region are severely oppressed, 
however, they might have a right to remedial secession—to 
exit with no penalty.77 
• These two options correspond with two contradictory 
principles of international law: territorial integrity for the 
sovereign and self-determination for the “peoples.”78 
B. The “Market” Mechanism 
Our goal is to design a mechanism that allows for welfare-
enhancing transfers of regions in a fashion that generally satisfies the 
primary constraints of international law (the principles of self-
determination and territorial integrity) while giving parent countries 
more incentive to either govern their regions well or permit them to 
exit. We explore that system in market terms, and we contemplate and 
 
 76. See supra Part I.A. 
 77. See supra Part I.B. 
 78. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 1, para. 1, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 
U.N.T.S. 171 (“All peoples have the right of self-determination.”); International Covenant on 
Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights art. 1, para. 1, Dec. 16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3 (same). 
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describe possible financial transactions, but these are a means rather 
than an end. The goal is to improve governance, subject to the starting 
points noted above and—as much as possible—the international law 
described below. Changes to the international legal system are 
required, but they are in the nature of filling gaps in the system rather 
than rebuilding it.79  
1. Who Must Agree.  The relevant parties are the impacted region, 
the acquiring nation or nations, and the parent nation. In this system, 
the region and acquiring nation would have to assent to any change. 
The parent nation’s power to veto a change would depend on its 
governance of the region. 
a. The People of the Impacted Region.  Consistent with the 
principle of self-determination, the population of a region would have 
the right to vote on whether to solicit, accept, or refuse governance bids 
from other nations.80 The parent nation would have to refrain from 
blocking or otherwise interfering with the vote,81 and the vote would 
take place under internationally determined standards with external 
monitors.82  
b. The Acquiring Nation. Nations wanting to exert sovereign 
control over a particular region could propose compensation to the 
people of the region for their approval and to the parent nation for its 
consent. The existing parent nation could also make a bid (to get the 
region to stay), as could the disaffected region (if it wanted 
independence).83 Such compensation could take a range of forms, from 
 
 79. Nations can, in theory, get together and formulate a treaty to govern border changes. 
Our goal is to see what can be done within the existing system. 
 80. For uninhabited territories, this step would be irrelevant—the negotiation would simply 
proceed between the nations involved. 
 81. Many countries forbid such votes, and even discussion of them. See, e.g., China Uighur 
Scholar Ilham Tohti on Separatism Charges, BBC NEWS (Feb. 26, 2014), http://www.bbc.com/
news/world-asia-china-26333583 [https://perma.cc/TXE3-S4KF]; Raphael Minder, Catalonia to 
Defy Court with Independence Straw Poll, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 4, 2014), http://www.nytimes.
com/2014/11/05/world/europe/defying-court-ruling-catalonia-to-press-ahead-with-independence-
straw-poll.html [https://perma.cc/92MR-TF53]. 
 82. The use of international monitors for elections has been extensive and increasing over 
the past half-century and both NGOs and the United Nations have developed procedures and 
criteria for how monitoring should be done. For a discussion of these mechanisms, including their 
problems, see generally JUDITH G. KELLEY, MONITORING DEMOCRACY: WHEN 
INTERNATIONAL ELECTION OBSERVATION WORKS, AND WHY IT OFTEN FAILS (2012). 
 83. Our proposal would not guarantee international recognition of the new state. See 
Christian Hillgruber, The Admission of New States to the International Community, 9 EUR. J. 
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lump-sum financial transfers to land swaps to military and political 
obligations.84 The only required element of the offer would be the 
option of citizenship for the people of the acquired territory.85 
c. The Parent Nation. The power of parent nations to block 
realignment of their regions presents a thorny problem. Under the 
current system, there are two possibilities. At one extreme, parent 
nations have full and complete rights to transfer regions—population 
included—to other sovereigns or simply to give up sovereignty and 
abandon the population altogether.86 At the other extreme, parent 
nations that severely oppress their regions can theoretically lose their 
right to control or be compensated for the loss of the region (the 
principle of remedial secession). Whether a nation can block the 
secession or realignment of a region, therefore, depends on how well 
the nation treats that region, which the current system treats as a binary 
question that depends on the existence of significant oppression. Our 
proposal incorporates these two existing options and offers a third.  
2. Three Approaches to Price Setting.  Our mechanism allocates the 
price-setting power to three different parties, depending on how well a 
region is governed: to the parent nation and region in cases of good 
governance, to the region itself in cases of outright oppression or 
genocide, or to the global community (with a right of review through a 
court like the ICJ87) in cases of governance that denies representation 
 
INT’L L. 491, 499 (1998) (“The reliability of the new entity as a partner in international relations 
is the decisive criterion of statehood in the sense of international law.”). But the kind of sale 
described here would, most likely, result in recognition by the parent state, which would facilitate 
broader recognition. See id. at 504–05.  
 84. STRAUSS, supra note 11, at 104–07 (describing different forms of compensation for leases 
between countries). 
 85. This requirement would help prevent the risk of colonial-style oppression. Versions of 
the principle have appeared in international law and practice. See, e.g., Convention on the 
Reduction of Statelessness art. 10, Aug. 3, 1961, 989 U.N.T.S. 175 (“Every treaty . . . providing for 
the transfer of territory shall include provisions designed to secure that no person shall become 
stateless . . . . In the absence of such provisions a Contracting State . . . shall confer its nationality 
on [otherwise stateless] persons . . . .”); Peter J. Spiro, A New International Law of Citizenship, 
105 AM. J. INT’L L. 694, 721–22 (2011) (discussing a similar problem in the context of state 
succession). 
 86. See supra Part II.B. 
 87. The ICJ is a possibility, not a perfect solution. See David Sloss, Using International Court 
of Justice Advisory Opinions to Adjudicate Secessionist Claims, 42 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 357, 
389 (2002) (recognizing limitations and arguing that “the I.C.J. advisory opinion mechanism is an 
under-utilized tool that may be helpful in promoting political settlement of some secessionist 
disputes”). 
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or equal rights. These three approaches correspond with notions of the 
parent nation’s territorial sovereignty as dispositive, irrelevant, or 
important. Keeping with current international law, the choice between 
these options—the degree to which territorial sovereignty must be 
respected—depends on how well the parent nation treats the region.  
a. Category 1: Set by Parent (Property Rule in Parent).  If the 
parent nation provides representation and equal treatment to the 
people of a region, the only valid transaction is one in which the parent 
nation, region, and purchasing nation all agree on a price. The parent 
nation’s interest is generally protected by a property rule, and it can 
veto any proposed transfer. Whereas the traditional approach would 
permit nations to unilaterally approve a transfer, the rule must take 
into account the modern right of self-determination, meaning that the 
region must also approve any transfer—something that many have 
advocated and which many nations already do in practice.88 
b. Category 2: Set by Region (Property Rule in Region).  In cases 
of extreme oppression, a parent nation forfeits its ability to say no to a 
region’s departure. This is remedial secession; it transfers sovereign 
control to the region itself. Absent ex post negotiation, the parent 
nation receives no compensation for its prior investments in local 
natural resources, the region’s share of the national debt, and so on.  
c. Category 3: Set by the World Community (Liability Rule in 
Parent—the Purchased Secession or Realignment).  The gulf between 
the preceding options is wide. What interests us are those cases that fall 
between these two extremes, in the range of what one might call 
medium oppression—where a government has denied representation 
or equal treatment to the peoples of a region, but has not crossed the 
line into extreme oppression. The Supreme Court of Canada 
acknowledged this category in its opinion on the possible secession of 
Quebec: 
 
 88. If flipped around, this principle rules out the possibility of forced secession or expulsion. 
The expulsion question, as the debates over Grexit illustrate, is complicated. We explore this 
question in Joseph Blocher & Mitu Gulati, Forced Secessions, 80 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 
(forthcoming 2017) [hereinafter Blocher & Gulati, Forced Secessions] and Joseph Blocher, Mitu 
Gulati & Laurence R. Helfer, Can Greece be Expelled from the Eurozone? Toward a Default Rule 
on Expulsion from International Organizations, in FILLING THE GAPS IN GOVERNANCE: THE 
CASE OF EUROPE 127 (Franklin Allen et al. eds., 2016). 
BLOCHER & GULATI IN PRINTER FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 1/5/2017  12:01 PM 
820  DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 66:797 
[T]he international law right to self-determination only generates, at 
best, a right to external self-determination in situations of former 
colonies; where a people is oppressed, as for example under foreign 
military occupation; or where a definable group is denied meaningful 
access to government to pursue their political, economic, social and 
cultural development. In all three situations, the people in question 
are entitled to a right to external self-determination because they 
have been denied the ability to exert internally their right to self-
determination.89 
The court found that Quebec did not fall into the third category, but it 
is easy to imagine situations that do.90 
In these in-between cases the parent nation’s sovereign control 
should be protected by a liability rule rather than a property rule.91 This 
would permit regions to exit—at a market price, subject to review by a 
third party—when they have been denied representation or equal 
treatment, even if they have not been subject to extreme oppression. 
Though the application of a liability rule in this context would be 
novel, the concept is not. Law often recognizes entitlements as 
legitimate while denying the holder of the entitlement the power to set 
the price.92 Such rules are typically preferred when transaction costs 
and holdout problems present obstacles to bargaining, or when, for 
 
 89. Reference re Secession of Quebec, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 218, ¶ 138 (Can.) (emphasis added); 
see id. at ¶¶ 128–35. Similar language is also found in the concurring opinion of Judges Wildhaber 
and Ryssdal in a 1996 case from the European Court of Human Rights: 
In recent years a consensus has seemed to emerge that peoples may also exercise a right 
to self-determination if their human rights are consistently and flagrantly violated or if 
they are without representation at all or are massively under-represented in an 
undemocratic and discriminatory way. If this description is correct, then the right to 
self-determination is a tool which may be used to re-establish international standards 
of human rights and democracy. 
Loizidou v. Turkey, 23 Eur. Ct. H.R. 513, 535 (1996) (Wildhaber, J., concurring, joined by 
Ryssdal, J.); cf. Milena Sterio, On the Right to External Self-Determination: “Selfistans,” Secession, 
and the Great Powers’ Rule, 19 MINN. J. INT’L L. 137, 137−39 (2010) (discussing criteria used by 
the international community to validate a group’s self-determination efforts). 
 90. The ongoing Ukraine–Crimea–Russia conflict seems a plausible candidate. Joseph 
Blocher & Mitu Gulati, Ukraine and Russia—You Break It, You Bought It, ERIC POSNER BLOG 
(Feb. 4, 2015), http://ericposner.com/guest-post-ukraine-and-russia-you-break-it-you-bought-it 
[https://perma.cc/FSS5-QVEN]. 
 91. The other possibility would be to vest the entitlement in the region and protect it with a 
liability rule. This possibility means that a poorly governed region could be forced to stay but 
would be entitled to compensation determined by a third party. We have vested the liability rule 
in the parent rather than the region partly because territorial sovereignty is the current default 
rule, and because our requirement of regional approval for any cession protects the right of self-
determination.  
 92. See generally Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 24 (discussing liability rules). 
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other reasons, the holder of an entitlement should not be able to say 
no but should receive some compensation.93 Many of these same 
reasons—including transaction costs and bargaining breakdowns—
support use of a liability rule to protect parent nations’ sovereign 
control in cases of regional oppression.  
As a practical matter, the challenge is to define what kind of 
oppression is sufficient to trigger the liability rule. One possibility is to 
peg the trigger to a threshold already found in international law. The 
Vienna Declaration suggests that the guarantee of territorial 
sovereignty extends only to “states conducting themselves in 
compliance with the principle of equal rights and self-determination of 
peoples and thus possessed of a Government representing the whole 
people belonging to the territory without distinction of any kind.”94 
Breach of those principles might be shown by flouting of CIL rules, 
U.N. resolutions, and the like. This liability rule would cover the states 
that fail this threshold—for example, by denying equal protection or 
representativeness95—by giving their regions a right to leave at a price 
set by an auction. If the parent nation rejected this market-determined 
price, it could seek review with some international body such as the 
ICJ.  
For example, if it were true that Ukraine’s corrupt government 
had discriminated against Ukrainians of Russian descent and that the 
people of Crimea genuinely wished to become part of Russia,96 then it 
 
 93. The prototypical example is of homeowners facing pollution from a socially valuable 
industry. Sometimes law will require damages to compensate them for their harm, but not give 
them an injunction to block the activity. See, e.g., Boomer v. Atl. Cement Co., 257 N.E.2d 870, 
872 (N.Y. 1970). 
 94. World Conference on Human Rights, Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, ¶ 2, 
U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 157/23 (June 25, 1993); see also G.A. Res. 50/6, preface (Oct. 24, 1995) 
(recognizing the “right of peoples . . . to realize their inalienable right of self-determination,” 
which “shall not be construed as authorizing or encouraging any action that would dismember or 
impair, totally or in part, the territorial integrity or political unity of sovereign and independent 
states conducting themselves in compliance with the principle of equal rights and self-
determination of peoples”). 
 95. We adopt this standard because we want to hew as closely as possible to existing 
international law, but there are of course many other ways to define “bad” governments: those 
whose people are poor or dissatisfied, for example. Nations respecting our two requirements—
equal protection and representativeness—will be subject to domestic political pressure with 
regard to these shortcomings, and so will hopefully address them to the degree possible. Outright 
oppressive regimes fall into the second category, and thereby lose the power to forbid exit.  
 96. See Anton Moiseienko, What Do Russian Lawyers Say About Crimea?, OPINIO JURIS 
(Sept. 24, 2014, 9:51 AM), http://opiniojuris.org/2014/09/24/guest-post-russian-lawyers-say-crimea 
[https://perma.cc/QJD3-VZST]; Valerie Pacer, Vladimir Putin’s Justification for Russian Action 
in Crimea Undermines His Previous Arguments Over Syria, Libya and Iraq, LONDON SCH. ECON. 
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seems more legitimate to say that Russia could acquire it at a price. In 
practice, this would probably mean offsetting some of Ukraine’s 
existing debt to Russia.97 (If this sounds too friendly to Russia, consider 
the fact that, as things now stand, Ukraine has lost Crimea and received 
nothing in return.) 
This would mean vesting an international body—probably the 
ICJ—with the power to determine when the liability rule has been 
triggered, and also the power to review challenges to the compensation 
that is provided to the parent nation in the case of a regional exit. This 
raises difficult questions of institutional design and authority that this 
Article does not attempt to answer. 
3. Best Practices.  The foregoing is an outline of elements that 
should be required for any transaction in the market for sovereign 
control. But as with any market, there are other rules and principles 
that might be desirable even if not required: 
 
• Require giving the people of a transacted territory the 
option of retaining their current citizenship;98 
• Require supermajority approval of the transferred region 
and a simple-majority vote of the parent nation, reflecting 
the comparative weight of the interests at stake;  
• Set standards or prerequisites for when regional votes must 
be permitted. Given the costs and the low likelihood that 
the vote will be in the affirmative, the option to hold a 
regional exit vote should be held at larger intervals of time 
than typical local elections—maybe every twenty-five 
years;99 
• Require parent nations to publicize all offers of 
compensation;  
 
& POL. SCI.: EUROPP (Mar. 11, 2014), http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/europpblog/2014/03/11/vladimir-
putins-justification-for-russian-action-in-crimea-undermines-his-previous-arguments-over-syria-
libya-and-iraq [https://perma.cc/3S4L-882T]. 
 97. See generally Blocher & Gulati, supra note 90 (arguing that Ukraine should claim that it 
is entitled to set off debt to Russia for having taken large portions of its country). 
 98. SHAUL ARIELI, DOUBI SCHWARTZ & HADAS TAGARI, INJUSTICE AND FOLLY: ON THE 
PROPOSALS TO CEDE ARAB LOCALITIES FROM ISRAEL TO PALESTINE 75 (2006) (describing this 
as the current custom). 
 99. Democratic principles demand that incumbent political parties must stand for election 
every so often: Why not hold the state itself to a roughly analogous standard?  
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• Encourage compensation in the form of dedicated revenue 
streams, providing some nexus between the form of 
compensation and the purchased territory;100  
• Forbid sales except when all involved countries have 
sufficiently democratic governments and institutions. 
Any or all of these practices might be desirable, but for now, the 
goal is simply to identify the minimum requirements for legitimacy.  
Figure 1. Elements of the Framework* 
 Category 1 Category 2 Category 3 
State of 
Governance 
Good (Strong 
Default Rule) 
Oppressive or 
Genocidal 
Denies 
Representation or 
Equal Rights  
Who “Owns” 
Sovereignty 
Parent Nation Region Parent Nation 
Who Must 
Approve 
Parent Nation and 
Region 
Region Region 
Who Sets Price 
Parent Nation and 
Region 
Region 
1. Auction; 2. ICJ 
(if Price Disputed) 
Corresponding 
Legal Principle 
Territorial 
Sovereignty 
Self-
Determination or 
Remedial 
Secession  
Combination of 
Territorial 
Sovereignty and 
Self-Determination 
Possible Example 
United Kingdom 
and Scotland 
Indonesia and East 
Timor 
Ukraine and 
Crimea (Arguably) 
* Italicized portions represent changes to the current system.  
III.  THE FOUR HORSEMEN  
Though we have tried to show that our proposal is largely 
consistent with existing international law and practice, the framework 
 
 100. For example, if a Hindu country were to purchase a Hindu region from a Muslim country 
to save its residents from religious strife, the purchaser might offer to build a mosque for the 
parent nation instead of simply writing a check. This approach might make the offer more 
politically palatable to the seller and make it easier to determine whether the buyer has performed 
its obligations.  
BLOCHER & GULATI IN PRINTER FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 1/5/2017  12:01 PM 
824  DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 66:797 
is nontraditional to say the least, and we have benefitted from 
extensive discussions, feedback, and criticism. We call the following 
categories of objections the “four horsemen” to capture the tone of the 
most strident critics. 
A. War 
  Stable boundaries help prevent conflict. Competition for sovereign 
control has led to global catastrophe twice in the last century and to 
countless smaller conflicts and wars. The diagnosis is correct—some 
boundaries are “wrong”—but the proposed remedy kills the patient. If 
you want to do something for peace, put this Article into a desk drawer 
and never speak of it again.  
International law strongly favors stable borders101 on the premise 
that they will discourage violent conflict.102 This supposition is reflected 
in doctrines like uti possidetis, which freezes the borders of newly 
independent states based on boundaries drawn by colonial 
administrators103 even when those borders seem to conflict with 
principles of self-determination.104 
The premise is debatable.105 Despite the stability norm, borders 
are frequently disputed both internally106 and externally.107 And 
borders can and do change peacefully—consider the “velvet divorce,” 
 
 101. See, e.g., JENNINGS, supra note 55, at 70 (“[T]he bias of the existing law is towards 
stability . . . . This is right, for the stability of territorial boundaries must always be the ultimate 
aim.”); Stuart Elden, Contingent Sovereignty, Territorial Integrity and the Sanctity of Borders, 26 
SAIS REV. INT’L AFF. 11, 11 (2006) (identifying “territorial preservation of existing boundaries” 
as a central tenet of the international political system). 
 102. Paulsson, supra note 35, at 122. The doctrine of uti possidetis is often defended or 
explained on these grounds. See, e.g., Org. of African Unity [OAU], Border Disputes Among 
African States, at 1, OAU Doc. AHG/Res. 16(I) (July 21, 1964).  
 103. Frontier Dispute (Burk. Faso/Mali), Judgment, 1986 I.C.J. 554, ¶ 20 (Dec. 22); Elden, 
supra note 101, at 12. 
 104. Cf. Frontier Dispute, 1986 I.C.J. at ¶ 26 (recognizing the conflict between uti possidetis 
and self-determination, and concluding that maintenance of the status quo was “the wisest 
course” so as to “prevent the stability of new states being endangered by fratricidal struggles”). 
 105. JOHN AGNEW, GEOPOLITICS: RE-VISIONING WORLD POLITICS 102 (Derek Gregory & 
Linda McDowell eds., 1998) (noting the costs of maintaining colonial boundaries). 
 106. Aman Mahray McHugh, Comment, Resolving International Boundary Disputes in 
Africa: A Case for the International Court of Justice, 49 HOW. L.J. 209, 218 & n.73 (2005). 
 107. Paulsson, supra note 35, at 123 (noting that 129 of such conflicts occurred between 1950 
and 1990, covering “roughly one-third of the then existing land boundaries” (citing PAUL K. 
HUTH, STANDING YOUR GROUND: TERRITORIAL DISPUTES AND INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT 
(1996))); see also Burghardt, supra note 10, at 226 (discussing examples of external disputes).  
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which divided Czechoslovakia into the Czech Republic and Slovakia.108 
But assuming for the sake of argument that stability does lessen 
violence both at the domestic level (by reducing potentially explosive 
struggles) and the international level (by discouraging interference 
with other nations’ affairs),109 the question is whether this new 
framework could do better. 
1. Preventing Incipient Conflicts.  First, consider the likelihood of 
incipient armed conflict in the case of disaffected regions. Violence is 
likely to be a function of at least three factors: the degree of unrest in 
the region, the parent nation’s toleration of dissent, and the willingness 
of other nations to intervene.110  
a. Degree of Regional Unrest.  Under the current system, as in ours, 
regions with low levels of unhappiness are unlikely to give rise to 
violence. In the current system, such regions are likely to accept their 
lot; in our system, they might explore the possibility of a change in 
sovereign control but are unlikely to push for it.  
When a region is deeply unhappy, however, armed conflict is more 
likely. In the current system, the residents of such a region might try to 
fight their way out of the parent country, or to increase the cost of 
affiliation to a level that the nation is unwilling to bear. The residents 
might even seek military support from other nations. The result is a 
powder keg. 
Under our proposal, the incentives are different. The availability 
of a market solution gives the region an exit option it did not have 
before—a means by which to leave a volatile situation. Violent conduct 
will be counterproductive because secessionist movements will want to 
demonstrate to other nations that they could thrive with a new 
affiliation, not that they are unstable.  
b. Toleration of Dissent.  In nations that tolerate dissent and are 
unwilling to constrain secessionist movements by force—for example, 
 
 108. But see Noel Maurer, Slovakia and Scotland, POWER AND THE MONEY (Sept. 17,  
2014, 2:36 PM), http://noelmaurer.typepad.com/aab/2014/09/slovakia-and-scotland.html [https://
perma.cc/KUV9-44NX] (arguing that the divorce neither reflected popular opinion nor delivered 
benefits). 
 109. For an example of an argument along these lines, see Donald L. Horowitz, The Cracked 
Foundations of the Right to Secede, 14 J. DEMOCRACY 3, 9−11 (2003).  
 110. There is a vast literature on the causes of war, and we do not mean to suggest that this 
framework is the only way to think about the issue. See generally JACK S. LEVY & WILLIAM R. 
THOMPSON, CAUSES OF WAR (2010).  
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the United Kingdom with Scotland in 2014—there is little risk of 
regional disaffection causing war. Decisions will be made peacefully 
under both the current system and the proposed alternative.  
But when nations do not tolerate dissent, the market for sovereign 
control is likely to outperform the present system. Under the current 
system, nations can and do use their police powers to ensure domestic 
law and order or protect their territorial integrity. So long as they do 
not go too far—and the threshold is high—they can use these powers 
to quash dissent. Our proposal would reduce the incentives for doing 
so and would give the parent nation an incentive to find a better match 
for its unhappy partner, particularly because fraught regional 
affiliations are costly.  
c. Outside Intervention.  Under the current system, a foreign 
government that would obtain a high benefit from secession might be 
willing to provide support to people of the disaffected region. Such 
investment can fuel the fire of domestic conflict. Under the current 
system, secessionist movements have a perverse incentive to escalate 
the conflict so as to justify outside intervention. Under our proposal, a 
foreign government that supports a disaffected region could pay the 
existing parent nation to allow the secession, rather than use its 
resources to escalate whatever nascent conflict might exist.111  
For all three factors, then, our framework would likely prevent 
armed conflict better than the current system. To be sure, this proposal 
would bring back an element of competition for territory, which carries 
risks. However, managed through a market for sovereign territory, 
such competition could not only improve domestic political 
responsiveness by giving nations more incentive to treat their people 
well, but could lessen the risk of international conflict by increasing 
economic interdependence. 
The winners of the competition in a market for sovereign control 
will not be, as in the past, the nations that have the most powerful 
militaries. The winners will be the nations that can best provide citizens 
of the various dissatisfied regions with an expectation of future 
flourishing and pay the parent nation compensation for the acquisition 
 
 111. The marginal cost of a financial bid might be higher than that of military action, at least 
when the military itself is already equipped and ready to fight. Indeed, as a domestic political 
matter there may be benefits to military posturing or skirmishing. We cannot fix that problem, but 
we do not worsen it either. 
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of the new territory. Escalating conflict will make it harder, not easier, 
to prevail in this regard.  
A market for sovereign control would reduce the incentives for 
potentially violent outside interference by would-be acquirers. The 
acquiring nation needs the approval of the populace of the territory. It 
therefore has an incentive to persuade the populace of the benefits that 
it can provide as compared to those that might be provided by other 
suitors, including the parent nation. An outside nation, if it does stir up 
local support for secession, will not necessarily reap the benefits of its 
misbehavior. It might succeed in breaking up the existing relationship 
only to lose out to another suitor.  
We might be wrong: perhaps the introduction of a market for 
sovereign control will incentivize or provide a smokescreen for bad 
behavior. A parent country might further mistreat a dissatisfied region 
to force it to accept a sale.112 A dissatisfied region might make things 
hard on its parent country for the same reason. Similarly, would-be 
acquiring nations might try to destabilize a nation or its regions to 
create the possibility of a sale. Neither current international law nor 
this proposal can prevent such destabilization. But the market would 
create desirable alternatives. Instead of spending resources on an 
invasion and dealing with sanctions and rebellions, nations would be 
incentivized to use their resources to make an attractive offer.  
One might also argue that the most serious risk of violence comes 
not from outside nations that want a transaction, but from those hoping 
to stop one. In most cases we would expect that sales of sovereign 
territory will enhance the welfare of neighboring nations because 
improvements to a neighbor’s economic circumstances tend to create 
positive externalities. But there will be costs, because neighboring 
nations may have to alter their defense plans and economic policies to 
deal with changes in their neighbor’s national identity. A market for 
sovereign control would provide a mechanism by which to take these 
interests into account: third parties could participate economically—
for example, by adding funds to a territory’s bid for independence.113 
Finally, the introduction of a liability rule could theoretically lead 
to violence—for example, if a parent nation refused to accept a 
purchased secession or realignment. We cannot rule this out—it is the 
 
 112. If the nation went too far, however, it might trigger remedial secession and therefore lose 
the region entirely with no possibility of compensation.  
 113. Cf. Ratner, supra note 1, at 823 (“[T]he international law on territory points toward 
substantive solutions during negotiations, whether offered by the parties or by outsiders.”). 
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same problem that arises in the context of remedial secession and self-
determination. But the net benefits would likely be positive. The 
region’s exit might prevent a civil war after all. Although the parent 
nation would not have a right to say no, it would receive compensation, 
which should limit its interest in going to war. 
2. Resolving Existing Disputes.  A second set of cases consists of 
situations when two or more nations have laid claim to the same piece 
of sovereign territory and the dispute has already begun. Such disputes 
are common,114 and while some seem harmlessly absurd,115 others 
exacerbate underlying tensions116 or escalate into violence.117  
Despite some successes, existing international law and legal 
institutions have struggled to resolve conflicts over sovereign 
territory.118 The result is that “[t]erritorial negotiations seem 
dominated by power, politics, bargaining and compromise; 
 
 114. See supra note 107. 
 115. Machias Seal Island is roughly equidistant from New Brunswick and Maine, and is the 
subject of a sovereignty dispute between Canada and the United States. Stephen R. Kelley, Good 
Neighbors, Bad Border, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 27, 2012, at A31. Canada’s Department of Foreign 
Affairs maintains a lighthouse on the island “for sovereignty purposes,” and pays for two 
Canadians (the island’s only inhabitants, besides seals and puffins of indeterminate nationality) 
to stand watch in month-long shifts. Id.  
For decades now, “Denmark and Canada have clashed over their competing claims to a 
small, uninhabitable rock known as Hans Island.” Christopher Stevenson, Hans Off!: The Struggle 
for Hans Island and the Potential Ramifications for International Border Dispute Resolution, 30 
B.C. INT’L. & COMP. L. REV. 263, 263 (2007). It has now become a tradition for Danish visitors to 
leave a bottle of aquavit on the island. Canadians retaliate with bottles of Canadian whisky. Id. at 
267 & n.30. Ratner points to similar actions, for similar reasons, in the Spratly Islands. Ratner, 
supra note 1, at 820 (“The results are the displays of Chinese, Taiwanese, Filipino, Vietnamese, 
Bruneian, and Malaysian authority in the islands, to the point of planting flags and hapless sailors 
on uninhabitable rocks.”). 
 116. How Uninhabited Islands Soured China-Japan Ties, BBC NEWS: ASIA (Nov. 10, 2014), 
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-pacific-11341139 [https://perma.cc/D87T-K4QM]. On the 
role of law in the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands dispute, see Chi Manjiao, The Unhelpfulness of Treaty 
Law in Solving the Sino-Japan Sovereign Dispute over the Diaoyu Islands, 6 E. ASIA L. REV. 163, 
164 (2011). 
 117. Paul R. Hensel, Charting a Course to Conflict: Territorial Issues and Interstate Conflict 
1816–1992, in A ROAD MAP TO WAR: TERRITORIAL DIMENSIONS OF INTERNATIONAL 
CONFLICT 115, 130−32 (Paul F. Diehl ed., 1999) (arguing that territorial disputes are more likely 
to lead to violent conflict than other kinds of international disputes). 
 118. See Todd L. Allee & Paul K. Huth, Legitimizing Dispute Settlement: International Legal 
Rulings as Domestic Political Cover, 100 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 219, 220−21, 229 (2006) (showing 
that of 348 territorial disputes from 1919 to 1995, thirty resulted in pursuit of judicial or arbitral 
solution); Ratner, supra note 1, at 821 (“The absence of compulsory jurisdiction outside Article 
36(2) of the ICJ Statute and compromissory clauses in treaties means that only in rare cases does 
the law require two sides to face an adjudication of their border dispute.”). 
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determining the role for law in this process has seemed almost 
impossible.”119 The ultimate resolution of the dispute in the South 
China Sea will be an important test—a tribunal in the Hague recently 
issued a rebuke to China, which in turn responded that the decision 
“[was] invalid and ha[d] no binding force” and that “China d[id] not 
accept or recognize it.”120 
A market for sovereign control could facilitate settlement by 
permitting countries to buy out each other’s claims. Parties can, after 
all, negotiate even when entitlements are unclear or disputed, just as 
they do in other kinds of settlement.121 These resolutions, once 
entrenched in treaties, would outrank other factors like uti possidetis 
and inherited title.122  
Our framework would not be a perfect solution to international 
disputes. Countries will undoubtedly continue to pursue armed 
conflict, for reasons of national pride, overconfidence, leaders’ narrow 
interests, failure to predict costs, and so on.123 But the market 
alternative provides one more possibility for avoiding war, and there is 
some reason to think that it could succeed. Simply bringing the parties 
to the table to talk about a transaction might get them to focus on one 
another’s interests and thereby help avoid bloodshed.124 Purchase will 
often be cheaper than war, and the international community might 
prefer to help fund a purchase rather than a military intervention or a 
 
 119. Ratner, supra note 1, at 808.  
 120. Jane Perlez, Panel Rejects China’s Claims in Sea Dispute, N.Y. TIMES, July 13, 2016, at 
A1.  
 121. See generally George L. Priest & Benjamin Klein, The Selection of Disputes for 
Litigation, 13 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 4, 6–30 (1984) (presenting a model in which “the determinants 
of settlement and litigation are solely economic, including the expected costs to parties of 
favorable or adverse decisions, the information that parties possess about the likelihood of success 
at trial, and the direct costs of litigation and settlement”). 
 122. Territorial Dispute (Libya/Chad), Judgment, 1994 I.C.J. 6, ¶ 73 (Feb. 3) (declining to 
consider arguments based on uti possidetis, inherited title, or spheres of influence because the 
disputed borders were defined by treaty); Castellino, supra note 57, at 566 (“The law as it stands 
suggests that uti possidetis juris lines may be modified by consent.”); Brian Taylor Sumner, Note, 
Territorial Disputes at the International Court of Justice, 53 DUKE L.J. 1779, 1804 (2004). 
 123. See Paulsson, supra note 35, at 124. Jan Paulsson explains:  
Not all boundary disputes can be reduced to an economic equation. States may contest 
territory that has no resource value but that has emotional significance or strategic 
military value. For example, there seem to have been few resources at stake in the 
dispute between Argentina and Chile in the Lagunda del Desierto arbitration. 
Id. 
 124. See ROGER FISHER & WILLIAM URY, GETTING TO YES: NEGOTIATING AGREEMENT 
WITHOUT GIVING IN (Bruce Patton ed., 1981) (describing the benefits of interest-based 
negotiation in international disputes). 
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postconflict nation-building effort. Even in volatile or war-torn areas, 
sales can sometimes provide a peaceful solution. Notably, Egypt and 
Israel were able to resolve their dispute over the Taba hotel strip—held 
by Israel following the 1967 and 1973 wars—through arbitration125 and 
negotiated purchase.126  
B. Colonialism 
  Trading sovereignty will lead to colonialism—rich countries, as they 
did a century ago, will use manipulative and coercive techniques to take 
over the poorest nations, just as surely as if they had invaded with 
armies. History shows that countries will leverage economic power into 
political power. Your proposal will produce a new era of imperialism.  
The colonialism objection to our proposal comes in at least three 
forms. The first is that countries and regions, perhaps because of 
coercion, will assent to undesirable proposals. Second, to the degree 
that transfers of sovereign control import or rely on domestic rules—
in defining what counts as consent, for example—introduction of a 
market could exacerbate existing problems by allowing nations to 
effectively sell out their regions. Third, within the liability framework, 
the diminishment of territorial sovereignty would give the ICJ, or 
another international body, power that might be used to disfavor 
certain nations.  
One response to each of these objections would be to limit 
transfers only to regions and countries that meet certain prerequisites: 
high levels of education and civic involvement, for example, or strong 
democratic institutions. This restriction would eliminate the liability-
rule transfers and lessen concerns about nations selling citizens without 
their informed consent while preserving an important role for the 
market in the cases like Scotland, Quebec, and Catalonia. 
But it would be a pity to deny benefits to the regions that need 
them most. There are three reasons not to fear that this market would 
devolve into an imperialist project. First, any time a territory is 
transferred from one country to another, its residents must be given 
citizenship in the new country. Second, the residents must approve any 
 
 125. Boundary Dispute Concerning the Taba Area (Egypt-Isr. Arb. Trib. 1988), 27 I.L.M. 
1421 (1988). 
 126. Alan Cowell, Israel Gives Disputed Resort to Egypt, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 16, 1989), http://
www.nytimes.com/1989/03/16/world/israel-gives-disputed-resort-to-egypt.html [https://perma.cc/
4K72-TNS7] (“Egypt paid $37 million for the hotel and agreed to allow easy Israeli access to it in 
negotiations that resolved the last obstacles to the return.”). 
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such transfer; thus, they have the right to refuse. Third, bad choices 
about borders will not be set in stone; the mechanism makes it easier 
to reverse them.  
The citizenship requirement puts pressure on the acquiring nation 
to share its resources with its new residents and respond to their 
concerns, consistent with domestic laws.127 Under colonialism, the 
reverse was true: conquering nations extracted resources from their 
colonies and the colonies’ people while denying them citizenship and 
therefore preventing political or other repercussions.  
Because it raises the cost of an acquisition, the full-citizenship 
requirement should deter rich nations who might otherwise rush out to 
purchase sovereign control over poor regions.128 One need only 
consider the lack of enthusiasm that rich nations have for immigration 
from impoverished nations. Indeed, critics of our proposal might 
suggest that its flaw would not be a lack of supply, but of demand.129  
The second protection against colonialism is the right of 
transacted territories to say no. Unlike colonialism, the acquisition of 
territory will be made not by force, but by consent. Here, dissatisfied 
regions will choose which outside nations can best help them thrive. 
That reverses the traditional pattern of colonialism. If there are 
concerns about misinformed, coerced, or fraudulent voting, 
international monitors and institutions can step in.130 
Historically, such fraud has been a problem. In many cases, 
territory was acquired “using unequal and even fraudulent treaties—
subjugation, and, in some instances, quasi-prescription claims.”131 But 
international law has come a long way. Coercive agreements are 
voidable. The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties identifies 
 
 127. We do not assume that countries necessarily treat their citizens equally in all respects—
most nations, including the United States, do not. See Juan R. Torruella, The Insular Cases: The 
Establishment of a Regime of Political Apartheid, 29 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 283, 345 (2007). But we 
assume that most countries treat citizens better than noncitizens. 
 128. See Should the U.S. Merge with Mexico?, FREAKONOMICS (Nov. 6, 2014,  
9:55 AM), http://freakonomics.com/2014/11/06/should-the-u-s-merge-with-mexico-full-transcript 
[https://perma.cc/9VH3-AK65] (quoting Austan Goolsbee on the possibility of a U.S.–Mexico 
merger: “[G]iven the fiscal set up of the US, if you’re going to add 60 million people who make 
less than $5,000 a year, under our current system, you’re going to have massive transfer payments 
and subsidies from what are now the United States to the new states . . . formerly of Mexico”). 
 129. See infra Part III.D. 
 130. The Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe’s Office for Democratic 
Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) is just one prominent example of an institution that 
already does this kind of work. 
 131. Castellino, supra note 57, at 529.  
BLOCHER & GULATI IN PRINTER FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 1/5/2017  12:01 PM 
832  DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 66:797 
coercion and threat or use of force “in violation of the principles of 
international law embodied in the Charter of the United Nations” as a 
basis for voiding a treaty.132 The same principles would void a coercive 
treaty of cession.133  
Critics might not be satisfied with these two protections against 
colonial domination. Perhaps we put too much faith in international 
law and institutions. The liability-rule regime in particular would 
empower the ICJ (or something like it) to make determinations about 
which countries have governed their regions well enough to retain 
them. Perhaps the ICJ will disfavor poor, weak, or non-Western 
governments, thereby becoming a roving colonialism commission—
determining which regions can be purchased and for how much. 
But this scenario is unlikely. Problems of definition and 
enforcement have always plagued international law, but the market for 
sovereign control would be no more susceptible to them than other 
foundational projects, including international human rights law. We 
have not precisely defined the threshold for the liability rule, but 
neither has international law defined the standard of oppression 
needed for remedial secession.134 And not trying at all means letting 
underserved regions continue to suffer in the legacy of colonialism: a 
high price to pay to avoid a fear of future colonialism. 
One might nonetheless object that our mechanism would 
introduce an element of colonialism by exacerbating inequality 
between rich and poor nations.135 It is true that a market for sovereign 
control, like any market, would favor the rich in that they would be 
able to buy regional control whereas the poor would only be able to 
sell. But, as in those other markets, locking out the poor can harm their 
interests more than letting them in. The market would give them a 
chance at something better.  
 
 132. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 52, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 333, 334.  
 133. Bautista, supra note 50, at 11 (“Clearly, a treaty of cession is void if it arises out of an act 
of annexation procured by the threat or use of force in violation of the U.N. Charter.”). 
 134. See Jonathan Masters, Why the Crimean Referendum Is Illegitimate, COUNCIL  
ON FOREIGN REL. (Mar. 16, 2014), http://www.cfr.org/ukraine/why-crimean-referendum-
illegitimate/p32594 [https://perma.cc/FVV6-QNS3].  
 135. Indeed, this inequality can happen even in the absence of any coercion or information 
failures. See Stuart Banner, Conquest by Contract: Wealth Transfer and Land Market Structure in 
Colonial New Zealand, 34 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 47, 49 (2000) (suggesting that problematic land 
markets cannot always be explained by the duplicity or failures of the contracting parties).  
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We do not doubt the strength of nations’ desire to expand their 
sovereign control.136 In fact, we count on it. A market for sovereign 
control could transform that demand into value for poorer nations. So 
long as the rightful “owners” of the valued good—here, the people of 
the territories that rich nations might seek to acquire—have the right 
to say no, then the strength of the desire for sovereign control means a 
higher price.137 Recognizing, protecting, and facilitating trade in that 
right should help alleviate existing inequality. 
C. Antidemocracy 
  There already exists a mechanism by which countries and their 
people can choose to alter borders: It’s called democracy. Your 
framework would undermine political participation and introduce the 
kind of commodification that corrupts democratic values. 
Although our framework employs a market mechanism, we are 
not attempting to put markets ahead of governance, but rather to 
activate a market for governance. The proposal could even be 
described as a form of global democracy rather than as a “market” for 
sovereign control. Borders would remain important, but people would 
be able to look beyond them when choosing their laws and leaders. In 
doing so, they could place whatever value they want on “noneconomic” 
values and preferences such as stability, cultural similarities, shared 
language, and historical affinities.138 Moreover, the “compensation” 
given to nations and regions need not be, and almost surely would not 
be, purely financial—it might include land swaps, military obligations, 
trade agreements, or cultural resources. 
Such a mechanism could serve democratic values better than the 
current system. As it stands, international law appears to give nations 
the power to abdicate sovereign territory without either obtaining 
approval from the territory’s residents or giving them a choice 
regarding citizenship. For example, the United Kingdom gave up 
control of Hong Kong and Kowloon in 1997 despite the fact that 
neither the United Kingdom nor China sought the permission of the 
 
 136. See supra notes 11–21 and accompanying text.  
 137. Who “pays” that price is of less import—it might come directly from the acquiring nation 
or from the parent nation as a way of obtaining the necessary consent.  
 138. Michael Ignatieff, Scots Have Revived the Majesty of Democracy, FIN. TIMES (Sept. 19, 
2014, 11:23 AM), http://www.ft.com/cms/s/2/e2cdcc62-3f5a-11e4-984b-00144feabdc0.html#axzz
4IkeMaP1Q [https://perma.cc/D86F-WN2Z]. 
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inhabitants of those regions.139 Nor were the citizens of the region 
offered U.K. citizenship. The same was true of Portugal and Macau in 
1999, Australia and Papua New Guinea in 1975, and many other 
situations since World War II. In none of these cases did the colonial 
power either obtain popular approval from the inhabitants before 
abdicating control or allow them to retain citizenship.140  
In other words, borders can and do change hands in the current 
system in ways that are far less democratic than what we propose. In 
our framework, where rights lie both with the people inhabiting the 
region and the parent nation, approval from the inhabitants is a 
precondition to any transfer of sovereign control. Concretely, the 
United Kingdom would not have been allowed to give away Hong 
Kong and Kowloon without prior approval from the citizenry.  
Adding a monetary consideration to this process would not make 
it any less democratic. Consider an analogy to immigration. Recent 
figures suggest that a quarter-billion people—roughly 3 percent of the 
world’s population—are migrants.141 They, the countries they left, and 
the countries that accepted them have all acted largely on the basis of 
economic considerations—a market of sorts.142 Immigrants from poor 
countries are attracted by valuable goods such as better educational 
opportunities, more jobs, less corruption, lower taxes, cleaner roads, 
better health insurance, and so on. Likewise, countries decide which 
would-be immigrants to accept based on their current wealth and 
future earning potential. Countries ranging from the United States to 
Saint Kitts and Nevis facilitate immigration for those who are willing 
to invest a certain dollar amount or create a certain number of jobs.143 
 
 139. More recently, Gibraltar has unsuccessfully demanded a vote as part of the discussions 
between England and Spain about its status. See Gibraltar Demands Veto on Future Status, BBC 
NEWS (Oct. 31, 2001, 2:11 PM), http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/1630056.stm [https://
perma.cc/WW5V-UHU6] (quoting Josep Pique, Spanish Foreign Minister, as stating: “The 
people of Gibraltar cannot have the right of veto over matters being discussed by two sovereign 
states”). 
 140. Waters, supra note 19, at 23–25 (describing border changes from World War I through 
the Cold War, and noting that “in none of the cases has assignment been subject to approval by 
the affected populations”). 
 141. POPULATION DIVISION, UNITED NATIONS DEP’T OF ECON. & SOC. AFFAIRS, 
POPULATION FACTS 1 (2013), http://esa.un.org/unmigration/documents/The_number_of_inter
national_migrants.pdf [https://perma.cc/4ZG6-NCNV]. 
 142. See Ayelet Shachar, Picking Winners: Olympic Citizenship and the Global Race for 
Talent, 120 YALE L.J. 2088, 2090 (2011). 
 143. See, e.g., Immigration and Nationality Act § 203(b)(5), 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(5) (2012) 
(facilitating the approval of green cards for immigrants who invest $1 million or at least $500,000 
in targeted employment areas). In some instances, groups of would-be immigrants have worked 
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Multiple E.U. nations—including Portugal, Spain, Greece, and 
Malta—offer visas and passports to foreigners who are willing to spend 
specified amounts of euros purchasing property.144 
In short, a “market” for nationality—and therefore sovereign 
control—already exists. Selling sovereign control over a particular 
territory would mean permitting group or regional immigration, which 
would be more democratic than the existing market for immigrants. By 
forcing marginalized communities to exercise their exit rights at an 
individual level, the current structure reduces their ability to engage in 
collective bargaining with their unsatisfactory governments. 
Individuals who find themselves unable to fully thrive under a 
particular national system but do not have the political clout to produce 
local change—for example, Tamils in Sri Lanka, Muslims in Kashmir, 
or Rohingya in Myanmar—have an incentive to expend resources to 
move, exercising an exit option rather than trying to change or improve 
their existing government. Their departure reduces domestic political 
pressure and saps the resources of the community they leave behind.  
Such market-driven competition is likely to enhance democratic 
responsiveness. The desirability of interjurisdictional competition for 
citizens has been described as a general matter by Charles Tiebout,145 
and within specific areas of law by many others.146 These accounts have 
been criticized on the basis that jurisdictional competitions are plagued 
by transaction costs because residence is sticky, which means that the 
practical and legal barriers to immigration are high. Our proposal 
 
collectively for section 203(b)(5) purposes. See, e.g., David Barer, Chinese Investment Could Kick-
start Pflugerville Office Construction, COMMUNITY IMPACT (Nov. 13, 2014), https://
communityimpact.com/austin/news/2014/11/13/chinese-investment-could-kick-start-pflugerville-
office-construction-2 [https://perma.cc/S3Q6-78H6] (describing “Project Great Wall,” a joint 
project in Pflugerville, Texas backed by three dozen Chinese investors seeking green cards); 
Smith, supra note 9. 
 144. Zoe Dare Hall, The Countries Offering Passports to Lure Property Investors, FIN. TIMES 
(Mar. 7, 2014, 6:23 PM), http://www.ft.com/cms/s/2/3d36db18-9fc3-11e3-b6c7-00144feab7de.html 
[https://perma.cc/92FN-UM2H]. Though passports are typically sold at the individual level, 
Kuwait has recently attempted to purchase Comoros citizenship for its Bidoon population. Peter 
Spiro, Kuwait Bulk-Orders Comoros Citizenship for Stateless Bidoon, OPINIO JURIS (Nov. 13, 
2014, 11:59 AM), http://opiniojuris.org/2014/11/13/kuwait-bulk-orders-comoros-citizenship-
stateless-bidoons [https://perma.cc/TT2M-4W67]. Without the Bidoons’ support, this would not 
satisfy our framework. 
 145. See Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. POL. ECON. 416, 418 
(1956). 
 146. See, e.g., Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Federalism and the Corporation: The Desirable Limits 
on State Competition in Corporate Law, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1435, 1442–58 (1992); Richard L. 
Revesz, Rehabilitating Interstate Competition: Rethinking the “Race-to-the-Bottom” Rationale for 
Federal Environmental Regulation, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1210, 1213–27 (1992). 
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would overcome these criticisms by bringing the new governing power 
to the people, rather than forcing them to go to it.  
Elements of this idea are already evident in international practice. 
The idea behind free-trade zones—or any choice-of-law system—is to 
use elements of another country’s legal regime. Nations commonly set 
up special economic zones with distinct rules. The charter-city 
movement has sought to establish cities that would be located in poor 
countries but governed by the legal and political systems of rich ones.147 
A market for sovereign control would add to this process, permitting 
an alteration of national borders to reflect the change in governing 
authority. 
By facilitating exit, the market could arguably corrode democracy 
by decreasing the relative value of loyalty and voice,148 lessening 
people’s incentive to fix broken systems. But voices for change tend to 
be more effective when backed by a credible threat of departure. 
Nations that want to keep a dissatisfied region will have more incentive 
to be democratically accountable to it. As for commodification itself, 
our proposal comes too late to cause additional harm—as noted 
above,149 governments already sell public land and yield sovereign 
functions. The market would simply combine those transactions.  
Two democratic objections remain. First, nations subject to the 
liability rule would have no choice but to accept purchased secessions 
and realignments from dissatisfied regions, which means that not all 
transactions would be fully voluntary. This is true as far as it goes, but 
the liability-rule regime only applies to countries that deny 
representation or equal rights to their regions, so the net effect on 
democratic values would probably be positive. Because nations will 
almost certainly want to avoid the liability-rule framework altogether, 
they will have an incentive to provide representation and equal rights.  
Second, what counts as a legitimate “approval” at the regional or 
national level must be determined by reference to domestic standards. 
This raises a risk that undemocratic nations will purportedly approve 
 
 147. See generally PAUL ROMER, TECHNOLOGIES, RULES, AND PROGRESS: THE CASE FOR 
CHARTER CITIES (2010) (arguing that chartering new cities for the purpose of changing and 
developing new rules to structure interactions among people will help raise living standards); 
Adam Davidson, Honduras Takes a Mulligan, N.Y. TIMES, May 13, 2012, at MM19 (describing 
Romer’s efforts to create a charter city in Honduras). 
 148. See ALBERT O. HIRSCHMAN, EXIT, VOICE, AND LOYALTY: RESPONSES TO DECLINE IN 
FIRMS, ORGANIZATIONS, AND STATES 31–32 (1970). 
 149. See supra notes 11–21 and accompanying text.  
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sales that are not in the interests of their citizens.150 Hopefully, the 
existence of a background market for sovereign control will increase 
the incentives for totalitarian regimes to govern well, even if only for 
reasons of economic self-interest. 
D. Impossibility 
  Even holding aside the astounding transaction costs, there is no 
demand in this supposed “market.” The immigration policy of every 
industrialized nation is highly restrictive, which is evidence that they 
have no interest in permitting—let alone paying for—the kinds of 
changes you envision. Moreover, no nation would ever want to sell, 
because no amount of compensation will politically justify the loss of 
territory. 
A market for sovereign control will not lead to widespread 
changes in national borders. On the buyers’ side, the world’s richest 
nations will not rush to drain their treasuries by incorporating the 
peoples of poor and oppressed regions. Cost aside, such nations have 
less need to acquire territory than in the past because they can 
increasingly rely on treaties and technology to achieve market access, 
protect foreign investments, and project military power. On the sellers’ 
side, the attachment to land might well be resistant to pricing. 
Moreover, domestic political pressure will probably prefer acquisition 
or retention of territory—an obvious and tangible thing—to a change 
in the inscrutable national balance sheet.  
We accept this criticism. Hopefully, a market for sovereignty 
can—even if rarely employed, and even if used just once—offer a 
workable solution to actual problems, or at least illustrate a way 
forward. Our goal here is to add an option, not to ensure that nations 
frequently employ it.  
The question is what factors would make the mechanism most 
desirable and likely to be employed. These factors could include low or 
nonexistent population in the region (simplifying the process of 
political agreement); economic need or crisis in the parent nation 
(increasing the incentive to sell); identifiable physical resources 
(making it easier to “value” the region); simple boundaries, as in the 
case of islands (making a clean break more straightforward); the 
existence of cross-border affinities between the region and another 
country (ensuring a desirable bid); “linkages” between regions and 
 
 150. For example, a particular region might collude with its own government to approve a 
sale that the rest of the country strenuously opposes.  
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forms of compensation (enabling dedicated revenue streams that 
would encourage transparency and political salience); lack of a history 
of violent conflict (improving the odds of peaceful negotiation); and 
high-functioning domestic institutions (facilitating information and 
reducing transaction costs of agreement). 
When these factors are aligned or particularly strong, the market 
for a new parent nation should be more desirable, such as in the 
following scenarios:  
1. The Lingering Colony.  Many former colonial powers maintain 
outlying territories, often at great expense, and sometimes against the 
claims or desires of other nations with a natural territorial affinity.151 
The Falkland Islands are an example: the United Kingdom spends 
more than $100 million annually on a region that has only three 
thousand residents. Argentina wants the islands badly enough to 
continue demanding their “return,” thirty years after losing a costly 
war. The strength of the demand is undeniable, and the example is not 
unique. The British, Dutch, and French all continue to hold sovereign 
territory that another nation might value more—think Gibraltar, which 
is much desired by Spain, and whose citizens would overwhelmingly 
like to stay in the European Union.152  
2. The Bad Equilibrium.  Some regions are beset with constant and 
costly tension, conflict, and suspicion vis-à-vis their parent nations. The 
parent nation expends large amounts of resources on law enforcement. 
The region suffers socially, economically, and politically. The result is 
a bad equilibrium in which each side suspects the other, misinterprets 
even well-intentioned actions, and retaliates against perceived slights. 
If the conflict were somehow removed, the region could thrive. A new 
national identity for the region, in this context, could potentially shift 
the relationship to a better equilibrium yielding large economic gains 
for all of those involved. If peace could be returned to Kashmir, for 
example, it might take advantage of its natural beauty and become a 
tourist haven. There would be gains to trade if a deal could be crafted.  
 
 151. Another common and perhaps less recognized scenario arises when nations wish to 
unburden themselves of expensive former colonies who refuse “independence.” We explore that 
issue, and the more general question of expelling regions from nations, in Blocher & Gulati, 
Forced Secessions, supra note 88. 
 152. See Brexit: Spain Calls for Joint Control of Gibraltar, BBC NEWS (June 24, 2016), 
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-36618796 [https://perma.cc/4LY5-5FR6].  
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3. Ethnic and Cultural Connections.  Some rich countries have 
ethnic and cultural commonalities with the people in an 
underperforming region in a different nation. These affinities give 
taxpayers incentive to help their brethren behind other borders 
whether by extending citizenship153 or through some other mechanism. 
Consider West Germany and East Germany. After the fall of the 
Berlin Wall, the richer west expended taxpayer funds to build up the 
impoverished east and gave its inhabitants full citizenship rights. This 
happened in part because of the ethnic and cultural ties that the 
inhabitants of the west felt with those in the east.  
4. A Small Oppressed Region.  Some rich nations—especially those 
that already spend billions on foreign aid—might be willing to absorb 
small regions that are being severely oppressed. With taxpayers in 
these nations currently contributing money and manpower to 
peacekeeping operations,154 altering an undesirable border might be a 
better investment. And perhaps the willingness of the population of the 
rich nation to take on the burden of helping some poor and 
underperforming region will be greater if the people of the rich nation 
see that there will not be a massive and immediate influx to their 
mainland of migrants who have different religions, sensibilities, 
educations, and so on. If the entire region is politically incorporated 
into the new nation, there is less need for the people to move.  
5. Self-Purchase.  Our focus has been on underperforming 
regions—those that would need an external buyer or at least external 
funding to escape their current situation. But there are rich regions that 
might want to alter their national affiliation, or set out on their own. 
Such regions might see the remainder of the country as a drain on them, 
and there may be basic philosophical or religious differences. 
Assuming no oppression or bad governance, such regions would have 
to gain the approval of the entire nation, but perhaps their resources 
would permit them to buy their way out of a bad relationship. 
6. Conflicting Territorial Claims.  An enormous proportion of the 
world’s borders are subject to dispute. Some disputes may be past the 
 
 153. See, e.g., Nick Thorpe, Hungary Creating New Mass of EU Citizens, BBC NEWS (Nov. 7, 
2013), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-24848361 [https://perma.cc/G5LB-GEX5] (noting 
a new Hungarian law offering citizenship to anyone who has “a direct ancestor who was a 
Hungarian citizen, and a basic knowledge of the language”). 
 154. See supra note 75. 
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point of peaceful resolution. Others are minor—conflicting claims to 
uninhabited islands, for example—but continue to fester because the 
countries involved find it impossible to negotiate. A market for 
sovereign control would permit one to offer to buy out the other’s 
claim, just as neighboring individuals often do when their property 
boundaries are found to conflict.  
IV.  CAVEATS AND COMPLICATIONS  
Any attempted solution to problems as intractable as those 
involving territorial sovereignty, border changes, and self-
determination will be hard to implement. The prior Part tried to 
address big-picture objections, but some caveats and complications 
remain. 
A. Who Gets to Vote? 
A change of nationality impacts not just current generations but 
future ones. This means that the standard rules regarding who gets to 
vote on the decision might need to be modified. Given the impact on 
future generations, for example, might one want the voting age for this 
decision to be altered? What if a parent nation packs a dissatisfied 
region with loyalists—might there be length-of-residence 
requirements? 
One option here is to rely on domestic law to define voter 
eligibility. But this could give the parent nation a way to interfere with 
the vote and might exacerbate underlying problems. What if, for 
example, a region wants to secede precisely because its nation denies 
women the right to vote? These problems are not unique to our 
proposal—the question of democratic legitimacy precedes this idea 
and will persist after it. Our view is that votes should take place under 
international standards, but we have not elaborated what those are. 
B. What Counts as a Region?  
We do not know what counts as a region, but we are in good 
company in that regard. The current right of self-determination as 
articulated in international conventions generally accrues to 
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“peoples,”155 and no one quite knows what those are either.156 Existing 
boundaries can provide some guidance. The boundaries of Scotland, 
Kashmir, and Catalonia are reasonably clear, at least on the map. 
There are also historically defined regions that remain widely 
recognized, even though they have since been broken up to serve other 
interests. Kurdistan is a ready example. But there has to be a way to 
allow for new regions—those where affiliations are not just a function 
of domestic law and history, but also of other factors such as ethnicity, 
race, religion, and politics. One of those factors could be “the peoples 
who are being systematically disfavored by a nation.”157 In a sense, by 
choosing to disfavor a particular region, a country would thereby 
establish both the conditions and the scope of the exit right. 
C. What About Stateless Peoples?  
Dispersed and landless populations get no direct benefit from our 
proposal. Even “remedial” secession is not much of a remedy for 
people who have been forced to secede. But the logic of the proposal 
can still be extended to help them. In a separate paper, we argue that 
such refugees effectively constitute the fourth category in our 
analysis—rather than simply having a property-rule entitlement in 
their own sovereign control (as in the remedial-secession context), they 
are in fact owed a debt by the oppressing country.158 That debt should 
be tradable so that oppressed populations can treat it as an asset that 
can be traded to whichever nation is willing to grant them entry. Other 
nations might for example purchase the refugees’ debt and use it to 
offset existing sovereign debts held by the oppressing nation.  
Illustrations are unfortunately easy to find. As of this writing, 
thousands of Rohingya are fleeing Myanmar. If the Rohingya had land 
and a clearly identifiable region where they were clustered, they would 
fit the remedial-secession category. But most of them have close to 
nothing, and whatever little the lucky ones have is being extracted from 
 
 155. See G.A. Res. 1514, Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries 
and Peoples (Dec. 14, 1960).  
 156. Reference re Secession of Quebec, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 218, ¶ 123 (Can.) (“[T]he precise 
meaning of the term ‘people’ remains somewhat uncertain.”); MARCELO G. KOHEN, Introduction 
to SECESSION: INTERNATIONAL LAW PERSPECTIVES 1, 6–9 (2006).  
 157. See Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of Independence 
in Respect of Kosovo, Advisory Opinion, 2010 I.C.J. 403, 614, ¶ 229 (separate opinion by Cançado 
Trindade, J.).  
 158. See generally Blocher & Gulati, Competing for Refugees, supra note 4 (discussing the 
support in international law for the notion that countries of origin owe such a debt). 
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them by the military as an exit fee.159 Neighboring nations have refused 
them entry. If, however, those nations could benefit from the value of 
the refugees’ claim against Myanmar, they might be more welcoming.  
D. What About the Rights of Minority Groups Within the Region?  
Separatist regions will often contain a minority whose situation 
might be made worse off by a transfer.160 A majority vote in the region 
itself will not protect them. One might think that the parent country 
will protect them, but this is not always the case. Imagine a region with 
three ethnic groups. Group A has the majority overall in the parent 
country, Group B is a substantial and disfavored second, but Group C 
is the majority in the region, with the rest of the population in that 
region being Group B. Group A might be happy to transfer Group C’s 
region, thereby selling out the members of Group B living in the 
region.  
One solution would be to make the vote requirement for regional 
exit very high (either in terms of turnout or percentage supporting), 
such that the majority in any region has to make a deal with the 
minority there to obtain its votes. Another possibility is to require that 
the citizens in the affected region be given the option to retain their 
prior citizenship. Either answer will increase the likelihood of holdout 
problems and thus make regional exit less likely. But a world where 
regional exit occurs only in extreme situations may be optimal. And it 
would also be possible for the dissatisfied section of the transacted 
region to realign further, even if that means another subdivision.161 
CONCLUSION 
Many regions—especially those whose populations are a national 
minority—feel oppressed and ill-served by their current countries. 
Some try to secede, but such attempts are resisted even in the most 
progressive countries. Other regions yearn not to strike out on their 
own but to join different countries. This desire is often viewed with 
 
 159. Todd Pitman & Esther Htusan, Myanmar Profits Off Rohingya Exodus, CNS NEWS 
(Nov. 6, 2014, 8:05 PM), http://www.cnsnews.com/news/article/ap-exclusive-myanmar-profits-
rohingya-exodus [https://perma.cc/SX66-S9AD]. 
 160. Jon Elster, Constitutionalism in Eastern Europe: An Introduction, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 447, 
452 (1991) (noting the “minority-within-a-minority” problem). 
 161. Thomas M. Franck & Paul Hoffman, The Right of Self-Determination in Very Small 
Places, 8 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 331, 383 (1975) (“[I]nfinitesimal smallness has never been seen 
as a reason to deny self-determination to a population.”). 
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even more disfavor. As a result, undesirable borders typically stay in 
place until forcibly moved by secession or the intervention of some 
powerful external actor. As the situations in Kashmir, Jaffna, Iraq, and 
Ukraine illustrate, the byproducts are often violence, instability, and 
poverty.  
We have tried to show how a “market” mechanism might 
ameliorate such problems by facilitating transfers of sovereign territory 
between nations while taking seriously the notions of popular 
sovereignty and self-determination. We have also tried to answer the 
strongest legal, practical, and theoretical arguments against our 
proposal. Many readers will remain unconvinced. Even those who 
accept the theoretical coherence and desirability of the proposed 
changes might still insist that they will never come to fruition in the way 
described.  
Our hope is that a market for sovereignty can—even if rarely 
employed, and even if used just once—offer a workable solution to 
actual problems. At the least, like other conceptual frameworks,162 a 
market should be able to point toward practical solutions by helping to 
identify the legal, political, ethical, or other obstacles that prevent 
welfare-enhancing border changes. International law remains haunted 
by the problem of borders and sovereign control. Our framework 
suggests one way to improve them.  
 
 
 162. The Coase Theorem, to take the most obvious example, is a central tool of legal analysis 
despite the fact that—as Coase himself emphasized—the world has transaction costs.  
